Between History and Strategy: Bangladesh-Pakistan Rapprochement and the Future of South Asian Geopolitics
The resumption of direct flights between Dhaka and Karachi in December 2025 is more than a matter of convenience. It symbolizes a broader recalibration in South Asian geopolitics following Bangladesh’s student-led uprising of 2024, which toppled Sheikh Hasina’s long-standing regime and ushered Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus into interim leadership. Against this backdrop, Dhaka’s foreign policy is shifting away from its India-centric orientation toward a diversified set of partnerships, most notably with Pakistan. The reopening of air connectivity, coupled with eased visa restrictions and renewed cargo shipping initiatives, reflects a pragmatic thaw between two states whose relations have been historically burdened by the trauma of 1971.
India has viewed the fall of Hasina’s government as a strategic setback. For years, New Delhi cultivated Dhaka as a “brotherly neighbor” and “eternal friend,” but relations have deteriorated in practice. Anti-India sentiment has intensified amid border killings of Bangladeshi civilians, rising trade barriers, and hostile propaganda campaigns in Indian media. Bangladesh’s foreign policy, once tethered to New Delhi, is now seeking strategic diversification. This shift has opened space for Pakistan to re-enter the South Asian equation. For Islamabad, Dhaka’s estrangement from India presents an opportunity to play a balancing role in the region, particularly as Pakistan’s ties with Afghanistan fray and India seeks to deepen engagement with Kabul.
The rapprochement between Bangladesh and Pakistan is most visible in the defense sector. Since 2024, Dhaka and Islamabad have exchanged high-level military delegations. Bangladesh’s Lieutenant General S M Kamr-ul-Hassan met Pakistan’s Army Chief General Asim Munir in January 2025, while Pakistan’s ISI Director General Shahid Amir Afsar visited Dhaka for intelligence cooperation talks. These engagements underscore a willingness to bolster intelligence and operational coordination. Bangladesh’s participation in Pakistan’s multinational naval exercise in the Arabian Sea, alongside navies from Sri Lanka, Myanmar, China, and 120 other countries, further highlighted Dhaka’s maritime ambitions. Admiral Mohammad Hasan’s remark—“Land divides but sea unites”—captured the strategic vision of connecting the Bay of Bengal to the Arabian Sea, thereby linking East Africa to Southeast Asia. The Army-to-Army Staff Talks in Rawalpindi in November 2025 marked the highest-level military interaction between the two countries since 1971. Discussions covered training, industrial collaboration, and operational coordination. Bangladesh has shown interest in acquiring JF-17 Thunder fighter jets from Pakistan as part of its “Forces Goal 2030,” reflecting a convergence of defense modernization strategies.
Economic cooperation is also gaining momentum. The resumption of rice exports from Pakistan to Bangladesh in February 2025—the first such trade since 1971—symbolizes the opening of new economic horizons. Bangladesh’s strategic geography, straddling South and Southeast Asia, makes it a potential hub for regional trade. Strengthening mobility from the Bay of Bengal to the Arabian Sea, while maintaining connectivity to the Strait of Malacca, could restore the Bay of Bengal’s centrality in global commerce. Future trade diversification may include garments, jute goods, pharmaceuticals, leather products, cotton, yarn, and industrial chemicals. Such diversification would reduce Bangladesh’s dependence on India for raw materials and food imports, while giving Dhaka greater strategic flexibility in economic negotiations. These developments suggest that the economic relationship is poised to expand beyond symbolic gestures into structured partnerships.
The restoration of direct flights between Dhaka and Karachi after almost a decade is a tangible step toward rebuilding people-to-people ties. Visa restrictions have been eased, with Pakistan waiving fees and simplifying security clearance for Bangladeshi travelers. On the educational front, Pakistan’s Higher Education Commission has offered 300 fully funded scholarships to Bangladeshi students, while delegations from Pakistani universities are expected to visit Dhaka to attract more students. These initiatives reflect Islamabad’s recognition that reconciliation must extend beyond state-to-state relations to societal engagement. For Bangladesh, such exchanges provide opportunities to diversify educational and cultural partnerships, reducing reliance on India and the West.
The trilateral defense partnership of Bangladesh, Pakistan, and China adds another layer of complexity. Beijing is the largest defense partner for both Dhaka and Islamabad, supplying over 70 percent of Bangladesh’s imported weaponry between 2010 and 2020 and 81 percent of Pakistan’s between 2020 and 2024. China’s vision of a trans-Himalayan corridor linking Chittagong to Gwadar via the Bay of Bengal undermines India’s connectivity projects, such as the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway. Bangladesh’s consideration of acquiring J-10C fighter jets from China, already used by Pakistan against India, underscores the strategic depth of this trilateral alignment. For New Delhi, the prospect of Chinese-backed Pakistani defense assets operating near its northeastern frontier is deeply unsettling.
Despite these advances, the unresolved issue of Pakistan’s apology for the 1971 genocide remains a major obstacle. Dhaka continues to demand formal recognition of historical atrocities, which claimed hundreds of thousands of lives. Islamabad has so far resisted, fearing domestic backlash. Without addressing this issue, normalization risks being perceived as opportunistic rather than principled. Bangladesh’s interim government faces the delicate task of balancing pragmatic cooperation with historical justice. If Dhaka can secure an apology through proactive diplomacy, it would not only honor the memory of 1971 but also strengthen its moral authority in regional leadership.
The resurgence of Bangladesh-Pakistan ties carries far-reaching implications. For India, Dhaka’s estrangement weakens New Delhi’s influence in South Asia, particularly along its northeastern frontier. For Pakistan, engagement with Bangladesh offers a counterweight to India’s growing ties with Afghanistan. For China, the trilateral alignment enhances Beijing’s connectivity and defense footprint in the Indian Ocean. For Bangladesh, diversification provides strategic flexibility, but mismanagement could destabilize transboundary security.
The resumption of Dhaka–Karachi flights is a symbolic yet substantive marker of Bangladesh’s evolving foreign policy. It reflects a broader strategic diversification in which Dhaka is recalibrating ties not only with Pakistan but also with China, Türkiye, South Korea, and the United States. For Pakistan, the engagement is part of a balancing act in a region where India and Afghanistan are drawing closer. Yet the success of this rapprochement depends on whether Bangladesh can reconcile pragmatism with principle. Without a formal apology for 1971, normalization risks being fragile. But if Dhaka can anchor its diplomacy in both strategic interests and historical justice, it may emerge as a more confident and morally grounded leader in South Asia.