Inside Bangladesh’s Emerging Islamist-Led Coalition

The new coalition, including both Islamist parties and more centrist ones, signals a sea-change in Bangladesh’s politics.

“Bikolpo Ke?” (Who is the alternative?) That slogan gained immense momentum during and after Bangladesh’s July Uprising, capturing the sentiment of fed-up citizens. The answer – “Ami” (Me) – became a rallying cry that symbolized the rejection of the established political order.

The quota reform protest of summer 2024, mainly led by students, turned into violent demonstrations due to the government’s oppressive response. Finally on August 5, 2024, the Awami League (AL) government, under Sheikh Hasina’s leadership, fell.

The movement brought an end to 15 years of authoritarian rule. In this political vacuum, several new political parties emerged.

The National Citizens Party (NCP) attracted significant attention with its founding on February 28, 2025. Formed by leaders of the July Uprising, the NCP presented itself as a centrist force, but its positions on several key issues soon led to controversy. Eventually, the NCP aligned with Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and several other Islamist parties, by joining the JI-led coalition on December 28, 2025.

The coalition, which was earlier known as the 11-Party Coalition, currently includes 10 parties: the JI, the NCP, Bangladesh Khelafat Majlish (BKM), Khelafat Majlish (KM), Bangladesh Khelafat Andolan (BKA), Amar Bangladesh Party (AB Party), Bangladesh Nezam-e-Islam Party (BNIP), Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Jatiya Ganatantrik party (JAGPA), and Bangladesh Development Party (BDP).

Five of these parties are considered right to far-right, while the remaining five are generally center-right to centrist. Of all the coalition members, the NCP was the most surprising inclusion: it abruptly departed from its previous coalition with the AB Party and Rastro Songskar Andolan, named “Gonotantrik Songskar Jote,” to join the JI-led alliance.

“Who is Bikolpo? We thought the NCP would be an independent force, fighting for reform, not aligning with controversial parties like JI, which has a questionable history related to the 1971 Liberation War,” said Spondon Tahsan, a second-year student at the University of Dhaka’s Department of Television, Film, and Photography. “It seems like the NCP is now merely running for power, not for reform.”

“Perhaps we’ll see the BNP in power, with the Islamist-led coalition in the opposition,” Tahsan mused, referring to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which for years has been the country’s largest opposition force. “But not much will change. They may have forgotten that people once recognized them as an alternative.”

As Bangladesh prepares for the highly anticipated 2026 national elections along with a referendum on February 12, the emergence of this Islamist-led coalition has altered the political landscape. Spanning ideologies from centrist to right-wing conservatism to the far-right, the new coalition is drawing attention both from the public and political analysts.

With the addition of the NCP, which has witnessed a surge in grassroots and town-level support, the coalition is increasingly seen as a force that could sway the elections. But what do these parties actually want for Bangladesh? What is their rhetoric, and how might it influence domestic politics as well as Bangladesh’s behavior and policies toward its two neighbors, India and Pakistan?

The New Coalition: Make-up and Platform

The coalition is dominated by five Islamist parties: the JI, BKM, KM, BKA and BNIP. These blocs are all committed to the principle that Islamic laws should be reflected in Bangladesh’s governance, society, and culture. While their specific ideologies may vary, they are united in their desire to integrate Islamic laws into the state’s institutions, seeking a shift toward a governance model rooted in Islamic principles.

Saif Uddin Ahmed Khandaker, a nominated candidate for Parliament from the KM, told The Diplomat, “Our politics is rooted in the demand for justice, human dignity, and a welfare-oriented state.”

He noted, “As an Islamic organization, our ultimate goal is a gradual transition toward a Shariah-based system, but such a transformation cannot be imposed. Any fundamental change must come through collective public consent and mass participation.”

Khandaker continued: “For decades, people in Bangladesh have been deprived of their basic constitutional rights – fair justice, freedom of expression, and the right to vote. Our immediate political objective is to restore these rights through a credible and neutral electoral process. We believe that if people are allowed to vote freely after years of authoritarian rule, they will choose a new political settlement that reflects their aspirations, especially the youth and those who have long been excluded from power.”

Clarifying his party’s long-term vision, he said the KM does not see elections as an end in themselves. “We participate in elections because it is a means to reach the people and to work within the existing political reality,” he said. “… Even if we are part of a governing coalition or sit in opposition, our focus in the short term will remain on judicial reform, human rights, and restoring the moral and institutional foundations that the state has failed to protect for decades.”

He also highlighted the coalition’s confidence in young voters, noting that the country’s youth, inspired by the July uprising, are expected to strongly support a new political settlement.

The coalition’s message resonates with a growing frustration toward Bangladesh’s secular political establishment, particularly the AL and BNP. Many people, especially underprivileged youth, feel that the traditional political parties have failed to deliver on their promises of equality, justice, and prosperity. This dissatisfaction has provided fertile ground for the coalition’s message, which promises a break from the status quo and an alternative path for the country.

Most of the parties in the coalition center religion in their public messaging. The leaders of the alliance often hold rallies and public gatherings where they emphasize a return to Islamic values. Sometimes they even call for rejecting Western liberalism and secularism, portraying them as corrupting influences. This religiously charged rhetoric is crafted to appeal to both devout Muslims and those who believe Bangladesh has lost its moral compass.

For example, at campaign events in Cox’s Bazar’s Kutubdia and other locations, JI aligned leaders and activists invoked religious imagery to press for votes, with one leader rhetorically asking, “If the Jamaat does not sell the ticket to heaven, then who will?” The same speaker even argued that failing to vote in favor of Islam could jeopardize a believer’s faith.

Popularizing Islamist Parties

The coalition’s strategy increasingly relies on social media as a key tool. Through platforms including Facebook, TikTok, Instagram, and YouTube, the coalition appeals to younger voters by constructing its own narrative of religious revival and social change. These platforms provide a counter narrative to the mainstream media, which the coalition often accuses of being biased in favor of secularism.

In this narrative, the coalition’s adherence to Islamic values is portrayed as a moral and religious struggle with the secular state of Bangladesh.

Leaders and activists argue that Bangladesh’s collective identity is fundamentally Islamic and that the country can counter its economic, social, and political problems only by returning to these roots. These appeals to social justice are framed as not merely matters of politics — they are presented as religious obligations. The right and far-right parties within the coalition use the slogan “Naraye Takbir Allah-Hu-Akbar” (“The proclamation of God is Greatest”) which appeals very effectively to mobilize support given that around 91 percent people in Bangladesh are Muslim.

This vision of a Bangladesh ruled by Islamic law helps Islamist parties to boost their popularity in both urban and rural areas of the country, where Islam reigns supreme socially. This is an opportunity for many Bangladeshis to go back to a moral base that they feel was lost under secular rule. For these citizens, a government based on Islamic values strikes them as offering definitive security in a season of constant political change.

Party leaders and activists use digital outreach to circulate speeches, religious sermons, and political promises — generally with strong imagery and touching quotes — so as to make the message resonate more with young voters. This focus is important given Bangladesh’s demographics: 44 percent of the voters are between 18 and 37 years old, making the youth a crucial segment in the upcoming general election and referendum.

In recent student union polls at different public universities, candidates backed by Bangladesh Islami Chhatra Shibir and Bangladesh Islami Chhatri Sangstha, the student wings of the JI, won top positions. While these campus polls are micro-level indicators, the results underline the robustness of JI networks and signal a resurgence of Islamist student politics – a sharp contrast to disintegrating secular student bodies.

The Islamist parties in the coalition benefit from their ability to mobilize through religious programs and community outreach. In the urban and rural areas, their candidates hold religious lectures and undertake social work. Such events not only serve as a vehicle for delivering their political message, but also allow candidates to cultivate an intense support base from among the general public – particularly Bangladeshis that have long felt neglected by traditional parties.

Thanks to its combination of religious and political outreach, the coalition has projected itself far and wide, significantly adding to its rising acceptability at the grassroots level and within the growing middle class.

The Non-Islamist Members

Alongside Islamist parties, however, the coalition includes several centrist and center-right actors, such as the NCP, AB Party, LDP, Jagpa, and BDP. And their decisions to join the coalition have sparked controversy, both within the parties and among the broader society.

For example, as a result of the NCP’s move to join the Islamist-led coalition, visible divisions within its ranks have emerged. Several well-known leaders, especially the women who had helped to shape the party’s reformist and centrist image, resigned in protest in the weeks following the announcement.

Samantha Sharmin, a senior joint convener of the NCP, told The Diplomat that the JI is “not a reliable ally” and cautioned that any seat-sharing arrangement could make the NCP “pay a heavy price.” She explained that the party was founded on justice, reforms, and a Constituent Assembly election to establish a Second Republic, and argued that the JI’s ideology and demands do not align with these principles.

The AB Party advocates for center-right policies like governance reform, social cohesion, and development. It presented a moderate voice. Although from its beginning the party’s narrative was not framed mainly in religious terms, sometimes their leaders’ speeches highlighted that they were not very comfortable with secular rule.

When here, the decision to join the coalition has led to internal conflicts in the party. Recently AB Party chairman Mujibur Rahman Manju confessed that joining the JI-led alliance represented a “failure to meet public expectations” and apologized to the public in a speech given at an event in Dhaka.

The LDP, in its turn, emphasizes good governance and anti-corruption. During the campaign, it was mentioned that the LDP played an independent role before joining the current coalition. It is noteworthy, however, that the LDP and AL-led grand alliance were in a coalition in the 2008 national general elections.

Jagpa and the BDP contribute additional nationalist perspectives to the coalition. They both emphasize Bangladeshi nationalism and Islamic democratic values. Together with the NCP, these parties help the coalition extend its appeal beyond strictly religious voters, blending reformist, conservative, and development-oriented perspectives with the ideological core of the six Islamist parties.

But even with the centrist and smaller parties, the internal balance is overwhelmingly slanted in favor of the more established Islamist parties, particularly the JI. The Jamaat brings to the table a wealth of experience at being in power and in the opposition role, and the party is prepared to run in 179 constituencies.

By comparison, the NCP is planning to compete in just 30 constituencies. While the NCP has been widely discussed for its links to the July Uprising and its grassroots appeal, it remains a smaller partner in terms of contested seats.

While parties like the NCP, AB Party, LDP, Jagpa and BDP are much smaller in terms of organizational strength and voter traction, they outrun the NCP in regional influence and madrassa networks. In practice, this means that the centrist and smaller parties are likely to be closely aligned with the larger Islamist parties and often follow their strategic direction.

Moreover, although increasing women’s representation is part of the coalition’s political rhetoric, however, in reality, out of the 10 parties contesting the elections, only the NCP has nominated three women candidates for election. The big Islamist partners, the JI and others, have not given a single nomination to any woman. This contrast reveals the gap between public discourse about women’s participation and the coalition’s actions.

What Unites the Coalition?

Asif M. Shahan, a professor in the Department of Development Studies at the University of Dhaka and a political analyst, told The Diplomat that the alliance lacks any shared political imagination for the country.

“I do not see a combined or coherent vision of Bangladesh within this alliance,” he said. “They speak of reform, but even within that agenda there are significant variations, including on women’s representation. This is not an alliance built on ideology or a common roadmap for governing; it is primarily an attempt to become electorally competitive. Beyond a few broad slogans about reform and justice, there is no clear long-term political plan.”

Turning to the NCP, Shahan questioned whether it can sustain its claim of centrism while embedded in a right to far-right Islamist alliance. “The NCP itself acknowledges that it lacks organizational capacity. Even in the 30 seats it is contesting, it knows that winning will depend heavily on JI,” he said.

“A party without its own identity or voter base cannot remain independent in parliament. You cannot claim to be centrist while asking your voters to support parties that openly advocate Afghanistan-style governance, Shariah-based systems, or restrict women’s public participation.”

Shahan argued that the JI will ultimately be the coalition’s electoral engine, but warned that its political strategy carries long-term risks. “Over the past year, JI has invested heavily in grassroots mobilization – door-to-door campaigns, religious training networks, and rural outreach – and that is already beginning to translate into votes,” he said. “But the alliance’s biggest weakness is its reliance on aggressive populist rhetoric, particularly anti-India narratives. Populist politics may win votes in the short term, but once in power it becomes extremely difficult to retreat from those positions. Escaping that populist trap, even within a democracy, is very hard.”

The Foreign Policy Implications

A significant element of the coalition’s political messaging is anti‑India rhetoric, which merges nationalist sentiment with religious and anti‑establishment appeals. Leaders within parties such the JI and NCP have repeatedly criticized New Delhi’s perceived influence over Bangladesh’s domestic politics, portraying India as a hegemonic power seeking to shape governance and electoral outcomes.

On several occasions, coalition figures have made provocative statements concerning India’s northeastern states, suggesting that Bangladesh might act as a counterbalance or shelter anti‑India forces. These remarks have drawn stern reactions from Indian officials, reinforcing the coalition’s narrative of defending national sovereignty against foreign interference.

By combining religious identity with nationalist fears, the coalition positions itself as a defender of Bangladesh’s sovereignty and moral order, appealing especially to citizens frustrated with mainstream secular parties and skeptical of India’s role in regional politics. Leveraging both grassroots mobilization and social media outreach, anti‑India narratives have become a central part of the coalition’s electoral appeal ahead of the 2026 polls. The coalition seeks to present itself not just as a religious alternative, but as a protector of national pride and autonomy.

Michael Kugelman, a senior fellow for South Asia at the Atlantic Council, told The Diplomat that a BNP-led coalition would likely balance domestic opinion with pragmatic engagement toward India. “A BNP-led government would try to split the difference between appeasing public opinion, which has been sharply critical of India, and taking a more pragmatic position that extends an olive branch to New Delhi,” he said.

By contrast, he argued, a JI-led coalition would take a much harder line. “I would not anticipate such a coalition looking to extend an olive branch to India, and this would be a worst-case scenario from New Delhi’s perspective. A JI-led government is a wild card, and if it came to power, steps would likely be taken to distance Bangladesh from India while exploring closer ties with Pakistan. Ideologically and politically, this coalition would reflect the public’s critical sentiment toward India, though practical engagement might still occur to protect Bangladesh’s national interests.”

Thomas Kean, senior consultant on Myanmar and Bangladesh at the International Crisis Group, argued that anti-India rhetoric has so far served as a mobilizing tool for parties like the JI and NCP, particularly at a time when public sentiment in Bangladesh is sharply critical of New Delhi. However, he noted that if such a bloc were to form a government, its stance would likely moderate out of practical necessity — though not to the extent of the BNP’s traditionally pragmatic approach toward India.

“Domestic political constraints in both countries would make reconciliation difficult,” Kean said, adding that a JI or other Islamist-led government would struggle to sell any conciliatory move to its base, while New Delhi would find engagement politically costly given how the JI is perceived in India.

He also said that a JI-led administration would likely deepen ties with Pakistan, a shift that would heighten Indian suspicions and further strain bilateral relations, especially amid unresolved issues such as water sharing, border security, and migration.

Bangladesh’s politics increasingly lacks the “alternatives” the July Uprising sought. Next month’s election now looks like a binary choice between the Islamist parties and the BNP – and Bangladeshis’ decision will reverberate across South Asia.