India’s Iran Dilemma: Strategic Autonomy or Strategic Dependence?

The war on Iran launched under US President Donald Trump has drawn two distinct responses from India. The first was an official statement by the Ministry of External Affairs expressing “deep concern”, calling for dialogue, restraint, and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. The second was a phone call by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the ruler of the United Arab Emirates, strongly condemning attacks on the Emirates and expressing solidarity.

Between these two responses and Modi’s visit to Israel just two days before Israeli strikes on Iran lies a telling silence. It is a silence that reveals the strain in India’s long-standing balancing act between Washington, Tehran, and Tel Aviv.

A Calibrated Response and a Noticeable Silence

The Prime Minister’s call to the UAE followed Iranian retaliatory strikes targeting the Emirates after combined Israeli-US attacks on Iranian soil. In those strikes, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, senior officials, and hundreds of civilians were reportedly killed. Iran also fired missiles toward Qatar and Bahrain, both hosts to US military bases.

Yet India has not explicitly condemned the breach of Iran’s sovereignty. Instead, it has urged “all sides” to pursue dialogue and diplomacy. What remains unaddressed is the manner in which Washington abruptly broke off two months of negotiations with Tehran reportedly when a deal was within reach.

Just hours before the strikes, Omani foreign minister and mediator Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi had indicated that an agreement was close, with Iran committing never to stockpile bomb-grade material. Delhi’s silence on this breakdown underscores a familiar pattern: its relations with Tehran have long been shaped, and often constrained, by its ties with Washington.

The 2005 Vote: A Turning Point

Criticism of the current government has come swiftly. Congress leaders have accused the Modi administration of betraying Iran. Yet history suggests that this pattern predates the present regime.

In September 2005, under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, India voted in favour of a US-backed EU-3 (UK, Germany, France) resolution against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The resolution stated that Iran was not in compliance with its safeguards under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and hinted at possible referral to the UN Security Council.

India’s vote marked a sharp departure from its traditional non-aligned stance. Iran had lobbied New Delhi intensely, appealing to shared developing-world solidarity and leadership within the Non-Aligned Movement. Simultaneously, Washington exerted pressure.

Days before the vote, US Congressman Tom Lantos warned that India’s newly announced civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States carried expectations of “reciprocity” especially regarding US policy toward Iran.

India voted with 22 other countries in favour. Twelve abstained, including China and Russia. Iran was furious. Tehran viewed the vote as a betrayal.

Iran’s 1994 Intervention: A Forgotten Chapter

The 2005 decision appeared even more striking in light of events a decade earlier. In 1994, India faced the prospect of censure at the UN Commission on Human Rights over allegations of violations in Kashmir. Pakistan had mobilised support within the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) for a resolution.

Then external affairs minister Dinesh Singh travelled urgently to Tehran. He secured assurances from Iranian leaders, including President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, that Iran would intervene.

Tehran did more than expected. According to diplomatic accounts, Iran effectively blocked the OIC move to table the resolution, sparing India a potentially damaging international setback. For many in Iran, this episode magnified the sense of betrayal in 2005.

Chabahar, Sanctions, and Strategic Drift

The fallout from 2005 narrowed political trust, even as trade continued. A key casualty was the development of Iran’s Chabahar Port, intended to give India access to Afghanistan and Central Asia while bypassing Pakistan.

The project regained momentum after Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with world powers. Modi visited Tehran in 2016. But when Trump withdrew the US from the JCPOA and reimposed sanctions, Chabahar slowed once more. India halted purchases of Iranian oil under US pressure.

Although New Delhi insists it remains committed to a 10-year Chabahar contract signed in 2024, Tehran has publicly expressed disappointment over the absence of allocations in India’s 2026 budget.

Israel, Gaza, and Growing Divergences

Today’s tensions are layered atop shifting regional alignments. The perceived warmth between Modi and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has added strain to India-Iran ties.

Iran has not hesitated to criticise India publicly. In 2020, Ali Khamenei condemned the Delhi riots and criticised the revocation of Kashmir’s special status. In 2024, he included India among countries allegedly persecuting Muslims.

Differences over Israel’s war in Gaza have also surfaced. When External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar visited Tehran in January 2024, Iran pressed India to help end bombings and lift blockades, while India reiterated its call for dialogue and a two-state solution.

Strategic Autonomy or Strategic Dependence

India presents its calibrated silence as an exercise in strategic autonomy. Yet to many observers, it increasingly resembles strategic dependence particularly on Washington.

For over two decades, India’s Iran policy has been shaped by US pressure, from the IAEA vote to sanctions compliance. What distinguishes the current moment is the visibility of alignment with Israel, the growing domestic scrutiny over minority rights, and the sheer scale of conflict engulfing West Asia.

Caught in the middle are India’s 10 million-strong diaspora across the Gulf and the broader region. Their security and livelihoods depend on regional stability and on a foreign policy that is not merely reactive, but principled.

India’s balancing act is not new. But as this crisis deepens, the space between silence and solidarity is becoming harder to occupy.

Final Thought

In conclusion, India’s cautious stance on the US-Iran conflict reflects a long-standing strategic dilemma balancing its global partnerships while protecting its regional interests. While Delhi has called for restraint and dialogue, its refusal to explicitly condemn attacks on Iran exposes the limits of its proclaimed autonomy, shaped in large part by decades of alignment with Washington and evolving ties with Israel and Gulf states.

As the conflict escalates and global reactions pour in urging de-escalation and diplomacy, India’s approach will continue to be scrutinised, both at home and across the region, for its implications on regional stability and its own foreign policy credibility.