Onslaught of Terrorism Tests Pakistan’s Capacity in Western Provinces
Pakistan has been experiencing one of its deadliest years since 2013 for terrorism-related deaths, with the month of July alone accounting for over 600 deaths.
The attacks primarily stem from the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) and the ethnonationalist militant group, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), both organizations with differing goals but overlapping areas of operation.
The Pakistani military has blamed the increase in terrorist incidents from the TTP and BLA on neighboring governments in Afghanistan and India, both of which have denied these allegations.
Regional instability, resulting from both the Israel-U.S.-Iran conflict and the 2026 Pakistan-Afghanistan war, allows for the free movement of terrorist groups and the smuggling of illicit or discounted resources such as fuel that can fund further action.
Pakistan has experienced high-volume, high-fatality terrorism attacks in recent years, but the attacks in 2026 have grown in both frequency and intensity. Pakistan ranked first on the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)’s 2026 Global Terrorism Index and “is the country most impacted by terrorism.” According to the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies, July of 2026 saw the highest monthly death toll for Pakistani security forces since 2023 and for militants in over a decade. Pakistani military spokesman Lt. General Ahmad Sharif Chaudhry stated that Pakistan has recorded 3,145 “terrorism incidents” since the start of 2026. Attacks consist of suicide bombings, kamikaze drones, small arms ambushes, or any combination of the three. Notably, many of the recent attacks by militants have directly targeted security forces at police stations, police checkpoints, and military convoys along highways. Pakistan has been conducting a continuous counter-terrorism campaign in response to the uptick in terrorist attacks. On July 31, Lt. General Chaudhry stated Pakistan had killed 2,084 militants since January, while a combined 819 Pakistani security personnel and civilians had been killed. He said that this was the first time since 2023 that the death toll of security personnel exceeded that of militants. Despite mounting losses for militants across various terrorist organizations, early August has already seen multiple high-casualty suicide bombings.
Ranked the third-deadliest terrorist organization in the world by the IEP’s 2026 Global Terrorist Index, the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) was formed in 2007 by various militant groups in what is now called the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in northwest Pakistan. The group mainly operates along the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, with its ultimate objective being the overthrow of the current government to establish an Islamic emirate. The group was particularly deadly in the early 2010s, causing over 3,000 civilian deaths in 2012 and 2013. Sustained Pakistani counterterrorism campaigns from 2014 onward drove down both the group’s attack frequency and death toll, pushing the group into a period of relative decline. This changed dramatically, however, after the Afghan Taliban’s August 2021 takeover of Afghanistan. The Taliban freed hundreds of imprisoned TTP fighters and leaders while also providing them with a safe haven in Afghanistan. This, by and large, provided TTP fighters with access to U.S.-made weapons that were available after the collapse of Afghan security forces. All of which triggered a resurgence of both the lethality and rate of TTP attacks in the years since.
Recently, the TTP claimed responsibility for an attack on a police checkpoint in the Hangu district. The attack, which commenced on July 30, began with the deployment of quadcopter drones fitted with explosives, followed by a small arms assault, eventually leaving 11 police officers and 15 TTP militants dead. The TTP’s use of drones in this attack and others — dating back to 2025 — reflects a broader trend in terrorism, with armed groups across the globe leveraging drones as part of a broader arsenal. This month has seen a continuation of TTP violence, with a suicide bombing on August 2 claiming the lives of seven police officers and nine civilians at an anti-militant protest in the Swat district.
Although the previous two attacks took place in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, the TTP’s range of operations also extends to the province of Balochistan, located in the southwest of Pakistan. The province, which borders both Afghanistan and Iran, remains a hotbed of extremist activity. On July 6, TTP militants ambushed a guard post at the Mangi Dam project in the Ziarat district. The attack left nine police officers and 15 militants dead, with 18 police officers kidnapped. On July 8, after being encircled by security officers, the militants executed the 18 hostages before subsequently being neutralized. These brazen attacks highlight the TTP’s strategy of pressuring Pakistani security forces in the less developed and more geographically isolated western provinces, highlighting the lack of state capacity in these regions.
The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) employs similar strategies of pressuring state capacity in their native province; however, unlike the TTP, the BLA has no ambitions of Pakistani regime change. Rather, the ethno-nationalist movement is a secessionist group, seeking to secure independence for Balochistan, which makes up 44 percent of Pakistan’s landmass, despite accounting for roughly six percent of the population. The historical region of Balochistan is also divided between Iran and Afghanistan, although most of the recent attacks have been perpetrated against Pakistani security forces. Like the TTP, the BLA uses suicide bombers in their strikes against security forces. On August 2, the same day as the Swat suicide bombing, a BLA suicide bomber detonated at a state-backed militia compound in the city of Khuzdar, resulting in approximately 20 deaths. An earlier attack on July 7 saw BLA militants ambush a military convoy in which 11 soldiers and some two dozen militants were killed. These assaults reflect a pattern of BLA activity, targeting military, government, and private sector individuals, and convoys traveling between cities and resource extraction infrastructure, such as mines and oil wells. This strategy seeks to deter foreign investment into the province’s mineral and fossil fuel deposits, which the BLA frames as exploitation of the native Baloch’s share of their natural resources. These attacks have the long-term effect of hampering investment into the Pakistani economy and the short-term effect of causing multiple strikes amongst truck drivers who are protesting the lack of highway security. Although it may not be caused by terrorism alone, in mid-July the State Bank of Pakistan recorded an almost 34 percent drop in Foreign Direct Investment from 2025 levels.
In response to the extreme violence against security personnel in July, the Pakistani military commenced Operation Shaban, a series of search-and-destroy missions conducted primarily in Balochistan, targeting militants from both the TTP and BLA. The result has been the deaths of over 130 militants so far, with many weapons and explosive caches from cleared hideouts being destroyed. Further intelligence operations are being conducted in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, with similar successes reported by the Pakistani military. While arguably effective in the short term, reducing the number of terrorists, their equipment, and bases of operation, the threat will not be permanently removed unless Pakistan can deny these organizations cross-border sanctuaries and safe havens. The historical lack of control over the long, isolated, and porous borders between Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan is being compounded by the regional instability resulting from the Iran-U.S. and Afghanistan-Pakistan conflicts, severely diminishing the states’ border-securing capacity. Therefore, while security forces appear to be routing the TTP and BLA, these groups still have avenues to regroup and rearm.
The Pakistani military has blamed the increase in terror attacks from the TTP and BLA on neighboring governments in Afghanistan and India, both of whom have denied these allegations. To this effect, in May of 2025, Pakistan designated the BLA and other Balochistan militant groups as a “Fitna al-Hindustan,” roughly translated to the ‘turmoil of India.’ India has rejected this labeling at the United Nations, describing it as misinformation and instead pointing towards Islamabad’s security failures as the culprit behind the attacks. Pakistan has also accused India of supporting the TTP, which it labeled “Fitna al-Khawarij,” or ‘outcasts,’ in 2024.
Similarly, Pakistan has accused Afghanistan of harboring the TTP and “providing the manpower for it.” The Taliban-ruled Afghan government has denied these claims, despite the United Nations Security Council reporting the contrary. Disagreements over Afghan involvement in TTP support have led to what Asif described as an “open war.” Afghan cross-border drone strikes have been met by Pakistani airstrikes on Afghan cities. According to the UN, these Pakistani strikes have killed approximately 500 civilians, which Islamabad rejects. With Pakistan having watched the 20-year U.S. occupation of Afghanistan right across the border, a sustained ground invasion is likely off the table. Therefore, the cross-border sanctuaries Pakistan alleges Kabul provides the TTP and the BLA may be even more accommodating during the conflict. The increase in civilian deaths from airstrikes and skirmishes also provides promising recruiting grounds for these violent non-state actors, as casualties among local populations feed grievance and revenge narratives that militant groups can use to recruit.
As TTP and BLA attacks have grown bolder, despite concerted counterterrorism and “sanitisation” efforts by Pakistani security forces, the instability caused by these groups is unlikely to evaporate overnight. Cross-border sanctuaries make permanent removal of terrorists impossible with the use of force alone. Regional instability, such as the Israel-U.S.-Iran conflict, and Pakistan’s war with Afghanistan allow the free movement of terrorists and smuggling of illicit or discounted resources such as fuel that can fund further action. Furthermore, the weakly controlled borders create the possibility of other terrorist groups, such as ISIS-K, moving across countries to compete for territory and influence, sparking further instability and risks to local human security. Ongoing repression in Azad Jammu and Kashmir over the banned political party, the Joint Awami Action Committee, may stoke the flames for more violent separatist movements. While the Pakistani crackdown on hardline Islamist groups appears to be lowering criminal blasphemy cases, doing so at a time when extremist groups have stretched state capacity may also have negative consequences. These groups, some of which have been banned under anti-terrorism laws, are known to incite religious violence and clash with security forces. Should these groups or their members perceive blasphemy or insults to Islam go unpunished, a new front for civil unrest could open. The TTP’s resilience and ability to rebound to similar or perhaps exceeding levels of violence from over a decade ago demonstrate the lasting terrorism and security challenges faced by Pakistan, which must simultaneously address the current terrorist threat on the ground as well as the systemic causes that drive it.