Kim’s mother’s. How North Korea is emerging from international isolation by supporting the Russian war in Ukraine

In early September, Russia and the DPRK opened a road bridge across the border river Tumannaya. Analysts note that it can become a key channel for the transfer of North Korean soldiers and weapons for war against Ukraine. After 2023, the supply of military aid to Russia became a key source of income for the North Korean budget, ensuring an unprecedented recovery in the country’s economy. Against the background of Pyongyang’s rapprochement with Moscow, China, which in 2017, together with Russia, supported sanctions against the republic, joined Moscow. The combination of these factors has strengthened Pyongyang’s position enough to stop it from needing to mitigate US relations. At the same time, Donald Trump demonstrates readiness for negotiations. If they happen, they can consolidate the status of the DPRK as a nuclear power.

In July, the Central Bank of South Korea estimated the growth of the DPRK’s economy at more than 3% for the third year in a row. The country has overcome the peak of the crisis recorded in 2017, shortly before вступленияthe entry into force of the largest package of UN sanctions at that time.

More recently, such a reversal seemed incredible. From the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korea emerged poorer and more isolated than ever: the country closed borders for a long time, international sanctions continued to inhibit trade, and conflicts around the nuclear program contributed to further alienation not only from the West, but also from traditional allies — China and Russia.

However, the resumption of trade with China, large-scale state development programs and military cooperation with Russia allowed to expand this trend, providing the DPRK with the most sustainable economic growth for many years.

For Moscow, Pyongyang has turned from a burden to a useful military partner, and Donald Trump’s return to the post of US President has once again made direct diplomatic contacts with Washington possible. The DPRK is perhaps the most radical example of the rejection of the post-Cold War world order, and its rapid withdrawal from isolation shows that this order seems to be beginning to collapse.
Unforeseen growth

The reconstruction of the DPRK’s economy began with the gradual opening of the country. Pyongyang has responded to the COVID-19 pandemic with virtually complete self-isolation. This brought down his trade with China from $2.8 billion in 2019 to $539 million in 2020 and only $318 million in 2021. In 2022, the cargo service gradually resumed, and in 2023 the annual volume of bilateral trade reached approximately $2.3 billion.

The restoration of ties with the outside world once again provided the DPRK with the supply of fuel, fertilizers, equipment and consumer goods, and North Korean exports allowed to return to the Chinese market. Simultaneously, Pyongyang has channeled significant resources towards construction and industry, and the growth of agricultural production has helped to lift the economy out of the pandemic-induced downturn.

Domestic policy played an important role in this turn. The DPRK leader Kim Jong-yun made the construction and development of regions one of the main state priorities. In 2021, the authorities launched a program to build 50,000 new apartments in Pyongyang in five years, and in 2024, an even more ambitious “20×10 regional development policy”, which provides for the annual modernization of factories in 20 cities and counties for 10 years. The main focus of the 20×10 is on the production of food, clothing and everyday consumer goods.

This approach is not typical for the DPRK, which has historically been characterized by extremely uneven economic development. The capital of Pyongyang and the strategic branches of heavy industry received a disproportionate share of public investment compared to the province, forced to survive through outdated production and informal economy.

The 20×10 program is an attempt to close this gap: to establish the production of basic consumer goods in the provinces, to develop the food industry, to modernize agriculture and improve living conditions. It is not yet clear whether new enterprises will be able to work in the acute shortage of electricity, equipment and raw materials. In any case, the authorities’ turn to the development of the province already gives the first results.

Satellite images show that construction began a few weeks after the announcement of the 20×10 program, and in the first year of its implementation, factories really appeared in all participating settlements. In 2025, the program included hospitals, leisure spaces, agricultural infrastructure and other local projects. All planned facilities were opened throughout the year.

In February 2026, the authorities announced the successful completion of the housing construction program in Pyongyang. Most of the new housing is concentrated in the newly created area of Hwason, where a dense multi-storey building has emerged on the site of the former agricultural land.

Foreigners who have visited the capital in recent years have told that the current appearance of the city is very different from what it was before the pandemic. The online sector of the economy has become more noticeable: mobile applications for ordering a taxi, payment by QR codes, services for the delivery of products and medicines, new shops and restaurants have appeared. Wide streets have come close to the limit of their capacity for the first time: in the DPRK, a flood of imported cars mainly from China, which are imported into the country despite UN sanctions.

The expansion of foreign trade and the turn towards the development of the regions have largely provided the basis for the recovery of the DPRK’s economy, but the main source of resources for this was military cooperation with Moscow. Since the summer of 2023, Pyongyang has become one of the leading suppliers of artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles for Russia.

Military cooperation with Russia became the main source of resources for the development of the DPRK economy

According to South Korea’s intelligence, by August 2026, the DPRK had handed over 15 million shells to Moscow. The Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS), affiliated with South Korean intelligence, estimates North Korea’s revenues from arms exports alone at more than $10 billion. For a country with an annual GDP of about $27 billion, this is an extremely large amount.

The subsequent sending of about 15 thousand troops to Russia brought hundreds of millions of dollars, although INSS confirms the receipt of only a small part of these funds to the budget of the DPRK. The rest may have been offset by military technology, components or materials, or remains in debt.

However, the amount of income to the budget in this case is not the most important. Much more important is the fact that cooperation with Russia weakens the impact of sanctions imposed on the DPRK. The restrictions imposed after 2016 were largely effective due to the willingness of Moscow and Beijing to participate in the isolation of Pyongyang, contributing to the restriction of its access to fuel, technology, foreign currencies, labour and export markets, on which it depended.

Now Russia plays almost the opposite role: it has become a major buyer of North Korean military-industrial complex products, against which sanctions were directed, and a supplier of resources to which they restricted access. Therefore, the current economic growth of the DPRK is not limited to simply coming out of the recession caused by the pandemic, but reflects much deeper changes in the international situation of the country.
Pyongyang’s place in the new world

The problem of the DPRK has never been the absence of strong allies. When the country was almost completely destroyed by a coalition led by the United States during the Korean War, Communist China entered the war in many ways out of fear that its borders would have a loyal Washington state. Today, the alliance with the DPRK remains China’s only mutual defense obligation.

The problem was different: Pyongyang lacked powerful partners who would need him himself. Since the end of the Cold War, North Korea has had little to offer Russia and China in exchange for economic and diplomatic support: scarce labor, a domestic market too poor to consume expensive imports, and a steady stream of international scandals related to the development of a nuclear program and regular foreign policy provocations. The turning point was the war in Ukraine. Those features of the DPRK, which previously made it a diplomatic burden for partners, have now become advantages.

This shift is well visible in Pyongyang’s relationship with Moscow. In 2017, Vladimir Putin said that Russia “unequivocally condemns” the DPRK’s nuclear tests and “fully complies with the UN Security Council resolutions” in its respect. In 2024, the Russian president came to Pyongyang to sign a mutual defense treaty, and Moscow purchased billions of dollars worth of North Korean ammunition.

These changes also affected international institutions, which were originally created to contain the DPRK. In March 2024, Russia blocked the extension of the mandate of the UN Group of Experts, which monitored compliance with sanctions against North Korea. This effectively eliminated one of the main mechanisms of control of the UN Security Council over the sanctions pressure on Pyongyang.

In March 2024, Russia blocked one of the main mechanisms for compliance with sanctions against the DPRK

For the DPRK, the benefits of cooperation with Russia are not limited to the income from the export of ammunition. Moscow provides Pyongyang with diplomatic support at the UN, and also provides access to fuel, materials and modern weapons.

According to some South Korean and Western structures, the partnership also provides for the transfer of military technologies, from air defences to missiles and satellites. The Korean People’s Army (KPA) still relies mainly on Soviet developments and their self-improved versions. Partnership with Russia for Pyongyang is one of the few real ways to develop its military capabilities in the absence of the ability to do so on its own.

The growing independence of the DPRK seems to have prompted China to take greater care of maintaining its influence, which has declined since the beginning of the pandemic and as Pyongyang’s ties with Moscow strengthen. In June 2026, Chinese President Xi Jinping came to North Korea for the first time in seven years. He promised that China will continue to support the republic, and agreed to deepen cooperation between the republics in various spheres.

In fact, Moscow forced Beijing to compete for influence on Pyongyang, providing the latter with a real alternative source of support. Now Kim can receive economic support from China and military and diplomatic advantages from Russia, while reducing dependence on each of these powers and preventing none of them from taking its influence for granted.

In such circumstances, Pyongyang is no longer so in need of softening relations with the United States, as it was in 2018, when the first talks between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un took place — and the first-ever meeting of the leaders of the United States and the DPRK. Then North Korea was practically cut off from the outside world, and the US could offer it attractive conditions: easing sanctions and normalizing relations in exchange for concessions.

Now the possibilities for such exchange are significantly less for the US. Pyongyang has maintained a nuclear arsenal, expanded the missile program, restored a significant part of foreign trade and established relations with Moscow and Beijing, which gives it the opportunity to gain many economic and strategic advantages that previously allowed normalization of relations with the United States. This does not exclude negotiations or possible steps towards rapprochement. However, the starting positions have clearly shifted in favor of Kim: Trump again wants to talk to North Korea, but Pyongyang needs it much less.
Trump’s Gambit

Donald Trump stressed his readiness to resume negotiations with Pyongyang almost since re-election for a second presidential term. He took the most serious step in this direction on August 16, when just a few hours before the beginning of the annual joint military exercises with South Korea, the Ulchi Freedom Shield ordered a significant reduction in their scale.

Donald Trump has shown readiness for contact with Pyongyang since returning to the White House

Trump said the drills were costly and sent North Korea an “absolutely inappropriate and hostile” message, and during his presidency, Pyongyang behaved “harmless and respectful.” The duration of the maneuvers was reduced from 11 to 5 days, while cutting the period of field training.

Later, Washington cancelled the joint exercises with Seoul, which were due to take place in September. Against the background of the position of Pyongyang, which considers the maneuvers to be a rehearsal of the invasion and demands to stop them, as well as to withdraw American troops from South Korea, Trump’s decision looks like a gesture of goodwill, while he did not even demand a personal meeting with Kim.

It is unclear whether the cancellation of the exercise has affected Trump’s apparent dissatisfaction that Seoul did not support Washington in the war against Iran, but such steps have already been taken by the US President. After the first meeting with Kim in Singapore in 2018, Trump announced the suspension of the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise and several smaller maneuvers.

Then he also argued his decision to the high cost of the exercise and repeated Pyongyang’s narratives about “provocations.” External circumstances, however, differed fundamentally: in 2018, probably, the most significant warming in the relationship between North and South Korea began.

Even before the cancellation of the exercise, the President of the Republic of Korea, Moon Jae-in and Kim Jong Un, signed a declaration that “there will be no more war between the two Koreas” and the parties will seek reconciliation, economic cooperation and even possible reunification.

Today, the rapprochement between the two countries was replaced by Pyongyang’s official refusal of reunification, the declaration of the Republic of Korea as a hostile state and even the destruction of the sections of the roads and railways that Moon and Kim once promised to connect.

In potential negotiations, the DPRK enters with a growing nuclear arsenal, a new mutual defense treaty with Russia and a much lesser dependence on the sanctions regime — in the past Washington’s main diplomatic trump card. If earlier Washington could demand significant concessions from Pyongyang in response to the cessation of the US-Korean exercise, now it becomes only a starting point for dialogue. At the same time, Kim has not yet proposed even the vague commitments that preceded the meeting in 2018.

However, Pyongyang does not seem to refuse to resume negotiations. According to South Korean intelligence, the new meeting between Trump and Kim can be organized “at any time”, but on fundamentally different conditions than in the past: now the DPRK considers its nuclear arsenal not as the subject of bargaining, but as an integral element of the state and the main guarantee of sovereignty.

According to analysts, the US war with Iran confirmed the conclusion already made by Pyongyang: the attack on Tehran was made possible due to the lack of a last-reliable nuclear deterrent, and therefore the arsenal must be preserved. Given the US course towards full nuclear disarmament of the DPRK, which South Korea supports, large-scale compromises are increasingly less likely, and a possible future agreement is likely to be linked to restrictions on the further build-up and application of the nuclear arsenal itself.
Korean rebalancing

With all these new and very significant advantages of the DPRK, the balance of power on the Korean peninsula is still clearly in favour of South Korea. Despite the huge number and central position in the state structure, the Korean National Army (KPA) is inferior to the Armed Forces of the Republic of Korea in the technological sphere, relying on much outdated arsenals.

The economic gap is even more severe: in 2025, South Korea’s nominal gross national income exceeded North Korean by 56 times. The annual defence budget of the Republic of Korea alone is greater than the estimated value of the entire economy of the DPRK. This gives South Korea the opportunity to modernize the army, make up for losses and maintain modern weapons systems on a scale that is not available to Pyongyang.

The only area where the gap between the two countries is beginning to lose importance is human resources. In 2025, South Korea’s fertility rate was just 0.8 children per woman. The demographic decline, which for decades was only a potential economic problem, has now affected a potential conscription contingent.

From 2019 to 2025, the number of 20-year-old men in South Korea decreased by 30%, and the active army – for a fifth, to 450 thousand people. The shortage of personnel has reached, according to different estimates, about 50 thousand soldiers. Seoul has managed to mitigate the impact through the restructuring of the armed forces, the expansion of the recruitment of contractors and women, and the technical modernization. But these measures do not change the basic arithmetic of the conscription system: each new generation has significantly fewer recruits than in the previous generation.

In 2019-2025, the number of young men in South Korea decreased by 30%, and the composition of the active army - by 20%

For North Korea, this problem is not yet so acute in comparison with South Korea. According to the UN, in 2025, the fertility rate in the DPRK was 1.8 – significantly higher than that of neighbors, but still below the level of simple reproduction of the population. When a small generation, born during and after the famine of the 1990 “s, began to reach the age of conscription, the authorities reportedly softened the physical demands on the military and began to involve women in the army.

After 2020, the working-age population began to decline by almost 1% annually. The State is increasingly sending young people to work in mines and agricultural enterprises, and married women are mobilized to factories and other production facilities, where staff shortages are beginning to be felt.

The demographic balance between countries is changing in two directions simultaneously. Seoul is losing its population of conscription age much faster than Pyongyang, allowing the latter to retain one of the few advantages not leveled by the economic superiority of the neighbor.

However, in the long run, the DPRK will face the same problem with far fewer opportunities to mitigate it. North Korea’s current sustainable demographic advantage is more correctly understood as a reprieve. However, this can significantly change the military balance until the rate of population decline in the DPRK is equal to South Korea.

In the long run, the DPRK will face a demographic decline without sufficient opportunities to mitigate it

Since the late 1980’s, almost all long-term trends have developed in favor of South Korea: its economy has grown, and the armed forces have been modernized, while the DPRK has only become poor and increasingly isolated. The gap between the two countries remains huge today, but it is no longer possible to say that time is definitely playing in favor of Seoul. The Republic of Korea is beginning to face the demographic consequences of the development of the economy, which has made it much stronger than its neighbor. For the DPRK, there was a rare moment when several factors that had previously worked against it began to weaken.

Economic recovery, military partnership with Russia, new interest from China and a reduction in vulnerability to Western sanctions have led the DPRK, probably to the strongest international positions since the end of the cold war. If Donald Trump and Kim Jong-yun sit back at the negotiating table, the US will have to deal no longer with an isolated rogue country, as in 2018, but with a state that, in an era of breaking the former world order, has discovered the possibility of survival on its own terms.