Pakistan’s Saudi Commitment Must Not Become a Gateway to War
Pakistan should honor its defense commitments to Saudi Arabia through strictly defensive cooperation and protection of maritime commerce, while avoiding offensive military action against the Houthis that could drag Islamabad into a wider Middle Eastern conflict, alienate Iran, and deepen its domestic and strategic vulnerabilities.
The Makkah Joint Defense Agreement between Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia was widely considered the beginning of an Islamic NATO. People in all participating countries celebrated the joint defense agreement without realizing the strategic obligations and risks it entailed. For decades, Pakistan had been involved in extraneous issues, especially the United States’ regional wars and conflicts. This not only damaged Islamabad economically but also shattered its social fabric. In recent years, the country has reoriented its foreign policy from direct participation in regional conflicts to that of a mediating power.
However, the ongoing conflict between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Houthis has once again placed Pakistan in a difficult position. Nonetheless, Islamabad has not officially declared any active assistance to Saudi Arabia against the Houthi government. Any such declaration or indication by the government of Pakistan would signal a departure from prudent diplomacy, entangling the country directly in a conflict involving Iran, the Gulf states, the USA, Israel, and the future of the world’s most sensitive maritime trade routes and corridors.
Pakistan’s New Strategic Dilemma
Islamabad’s only option is to adopt a legitimate role. It can defend Saudi territory against any external threats under explicitly defined bilateral arrangements
Yemen’s Houthis are no longer just an insurgent group. They control most of northern Yemen, including the country’s capital, Sana’a, and possess drones, missiles, and maritime-strike capabilities. Reports of their attempt to build ballistic missiles using Anthropic AI demonstrate their active pursuit of modern advanced weapons. The Houthis’ confrontation with Israel and their attack on commercial vessels have projected them into the wider Middle Eastern conflict. Despite an international strategic divide over their actions, much of the Muslim world views them as supporting Palestinians and resistance to Israeli genocide in Gaza.
The Strategic Stakes of Bab el-Mandeb
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a narrow maritime route that connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and Asia with Europe, holds a central position in this conflict. The Houthis’ leverage around Bab el-Mandeb enables them to disrupt shipping, increase oil prices, raise insurance costs, and extend transit times. The Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb are two strategic maritime chokepoints whose disruption could destabilize global trade and increase inflation.
However, Islamabad must mark a clear distinction between entering the Saudi-Houthi war and protecting global commercial navigation. It needs to realize that supporting Yemeni or Saudi forces, conducting airstrikes, identifying Houthi positions, or helping any side capture another’s territory is different from naval protection of Pakistani shipping, intelligence sharing, and participation in globally defined anti-piracy operations. The first type would provide a legitimate defense option, while the other could make it a party to the Middle Eastern conflict.
This distinction holds critical significance as the Houthis are widely known as Iran’s proxy group in Yemen. Iran provides key military, technological, strategic, and political assistance to Houthis. Pakistan’s assistance to Saudi or Yemeni forces against the Houthis would be read as Islamabad joining the anti-Iran regional coalition, damaging an indispensable relationship between two South Asian neighbors.
Pakistan Must Avoid Another Regional Quagmire
Pakistan is already navigating a heavily burdened strategic environment. Islamabad’s historic rivalry with India has only been restrained by a fragile ceasefire, and the threat of escalation between two nuclear-armed neighbors continues. A new escalation could revive that conflict with unprecedented swiftness. On its western border, Pakistan is engaged in a precarious standoff with terrorists using Afghan soil. This standoff has also strained the Pakistani government’s relations with the Taliban government. Terrorist attacks in Islamabad continue to increase, and the Pakistani government accuses the Afghan government of its inaction against these organizations.
Pakistan would also have to face domestic repercussions, as the country’s Shia community is closely aligned with the ideology of the Iranian Islamic regime. Moreover, religious political parties, student organizations, civil-society factions, and opposition parties could also mobilize against the government for any action against the Houthis. The current Pakistani government is already struggling with declining popularity. Pakistani people would see any such move as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause.
Therefore, a direct Pakistani involvement in the Saudi-Houthi conflict would further weaken the government’s position at home. Moreover, Israel and the United States will also be skeptical of Pakistan’s expanded role in the region. In addition, it would be difficult for Islamabad to meet the US regional expectations. Thus, for Pakistan, calculations must not be based on how much Saudi Arabia may invest or deposit in Pakistani accounts. It should be based on Pakistan’s regional and domestic interests.
The history of Yemen also provides a significant warning, as the Houthi group has survived the Saudi attacks for decades despite the latter’s military superiority. Years of military conflict have made the Houthis a battle-hardened militia. Therefore, Pakistan needs to ask what its military involvement could achieve. Islamabad’s only option is to adopt a legitimate role. It can defend Saudi territory against any external threats under explicitly defined bilateral arrangements. Pakistan can train the Saudi military, protect Pakistani shipping, and offer its mediation to resolve the Saudi-Houthi conflict peacefully. Islamabad can also use its influence in the Muslim world to de-escalate the Middle Eastern crisis. However, any involvement in an offensive operation against the Houthis would place the country in a difficult position internationally and domestically.
Conclusion
Therefore, the most prudent approach is defensive cooperation with Saudi Arabia to protect its territorial sovereignty, protect legitimate maritime trade, refuse to participate in any offensive against the Houthis, and support diplomatic negotiations. Islamabad can stand with Riyadh without alienating Iran or any of its regional allies and supporters. Although this balance may be difficult, it is Pakistan’s only prudent option. Pakistan must consider its domestic and international responsibilities and interests before entangling in any Saudi offensive in the Middle East. Otherwise, it would once again be exposed to terrorism and international conflicts.