China’s Geopolitical Ambitions and Projects: Strategy, Doctrines, and Implementation Practices
Introduction
In the 21st century, China has transformed itself from a regional power into a global player whose actions shape the development of international relations. Its geopolitical ambitions are based on a combination of historical memory, economic might, technological progress, and military power, formalized in clear doctrines and large-scale projects [13]. While at the end of the 20th century, Beijing’s policy was focused on “concealing power and biding its time,” with the rise to power of Xi Jinping, it has acquired the character of an active projection of influence, aimed at achieving a “great national rejuvenation” by 2049—the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China [14].
The purpose of this article is to systematize the main geopolitical doctrines of China, analyze key projects of an economic, military and technological nature, assess their geographical specificity and impact on the global order [8].
Chapter 1. Ideological foundations and strategic doctrines
1.1 “Chinese Dream” as the Basis of National Ideology
In 2013, Xi Jinping introduced the concept of the “Chinese Dream” (Zhongguo Meng), which has become the central ideology of modern China [5]. Its essence lies in restoring the country’s status as a “middle power”—the center of world civilization, which it occupied before the “century of humiliation” (1839–1949). The concept combines three key components:
- Economic prosperity and overcoming the “middle income trap”;
- National unity and restoration of territorial integrity (including unification with Taiwan);
- Strengthening international influence and creating a just multipolar world [14].
1.2 The Doctrine of Multipolarity and Global Initiatives
China positions itself as an opponent of a unipolar world and a supporter of multipolarity based on the equality of sovereignty and the rule of international law [13]. In recent years, Beijing has put forward a number of global initiatives that shape a new foreign policy doctrine:
- Global Development Initiative – aims to address issues of inequality, poverty and sustainable development, with an emphasis on cooperation with countries of the Global South [8];
- The Global Security Initiative offers a model of collective security based on mutual trust and consideration of the interests of all parties [9];
- The Global Civilization Initiative emphasizes the diversity of cultures and civilizations, rejecting the idea of the universality of Western values [14];
- The Global Governance Initiative is based on the principles of equality of sovereignties, multilateralism and practical effectiveness [8].
1.3 The Doctrine of the “New National System” and Strategic Endurance
The 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) formalizes the concept of a “new national system,” which integrates the state, industry, science, and security into a single strategic management structure [6]. The key principle is “using a new security model to guarantee a new development model,” according to which all policy areas are subordinated to the task of preserving sovereignty and competitiveness [13]. The doctrine of “strategic endurance” presupposes China’s ability to withstand long-term confrontation without losing internal stability and development dynamics [11].
1.4 Evolution of the principle of non-intervention
China has traditionally adhered to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. However, in recent years, it has gradually shifted to a model that experts call “interventionism 2.0″—actively protecting its interests and those of its partners abroad, including providing support in the event of external threats [14]. Beijing emphasizes that its actions are not aimed at regime change or imposing its own model, but are based on mutual benefit. This approach has been described as a “combination of the imperial and hegemonic styles”—a combination of moral authority and the ability to use force [5].
Chapter 2. Economic Projects as a Geopolitical Instrument
2.1 The Belt and Road Initiative – the infrastructure basis of influence
Launched in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the largest infrastructure project of modern times, spanning over 150 countries and international organizations [4]. Total investment is estimated in trillions of dollars, with contract awards reaching a record $124 billion in the first six months of 2025 alone [5].
Project structure:
- The Silk Road Economic Belt is a land route connecting China with Europe through Central Asia and Russia, with the Middle East and South Asia [4];
- The Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century – sea routes from China to Europe and Africa via the Indian Ocean [4].
Key corridors and facilities:
- China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) – with an investment volume of over $62 billion, connects Xinjiang with the port of Gwadar, providing access to the Arabian Sea [3];
- China-Myanmar corridor – Kyaukpyu port and 770 km long pipelines [4];
- Port empire: China gained control or significant influence over strategic ports: Piraeus (Greece), Haifa (Israel), Trieste (Italy), Gwadar (Pakistan), Chancay (Peru) and many others [13].
The project’s objectives are to create an integrated Eurasian economic system with China at the center, ensure access to resources and markets, and form structural dependence between partners [14].
2.2 Financial institutions and industrial policy
China is actively developing its own financial architecture, an alternative to the Western one:
- Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) – more than 100 members, financing infrastructure projects [8];
- New BRICS Development Bank – financing development projects in the countries of the Global South [13];
- Development of settlements in national currencies to reduce dependence on the US dollar [13].
The “Made in China 2025” program aims to transition from low-cost assembly to high-tech manufacturing. The goal is to ensure domestic production of 70% of basic components by 2025 and achieve complete technological sovereignty [6].
Chapter 3. Military Strategy and Modernization of the Armed Forces
3.1 Doctrine and Financing
The official military doctrine defines “hegemonism, power politics and bloc thinking” as the main threat, primarily from the United States and its allies [9].
- Budget for 2026: 1.91 trillion yuan (~$277 billion), an increase of 7% [12]. SIPRI estimates that actual expenditure will reach $313.7 billion [9].
- Over the past two decades, the military budget has grown more than 7 times [12].
3.2 Structure and capabilities
- Naval forces: more than 350 warships (exceeds the US Navy), 3 aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines. By 2030, up to 435 units are expected [3];
- Nuclear forces: more than 600 operational warheads, with more than 1,000 predicted by 2030. China is a leader in the development of hypersonic missiles [9];
- Space and cyber forces: Beidou navigation system, reconnaissance satellites, powerful potential in the field of cyber warfare and electronic warfare [7].
3.3 Activity and presence
- In 2022, 1,737 aircraft were sent to Taiwan’s air defense zone, which is 79% more than in 2021 [1];
- China has military cooperation with more than 150 countries, the key partner being Russia [13].
Chapter 4. Technological Leadership and New Frontiers
4.1 Artificial Intelligence and the Digital Economy
According to the 2017 plan, China is expected to become a global leader in artificial intelligence by 2030 [6]. As part of the BPI, the “Digital Silk Road” concept is being implemented, including the creation of 5G networks, data centers, and smart city systems in more than 40 countries [7].
4.2 Control over critical resources
China dominates the rare earth metals market, controlling 60–80% of production and almost 100% of the refining process, providing strategic leverage over global high-tech supply chains [6].
4.3 The Arctic, the Deep Sea, and Space
- Arctic: positions itself as a “country close to the Arctic”, builds icebreakers, explores resources and transport routes [13];
- Deep-sea exploration: holds 5 permits to exploit mineral resources on the ocean floor (more than any other country) [13];
- Space: more than 700 satellites in orbit, its own space station, programs for exploring the Moon and Mars [7].
Chapter 5. Geography of projects: regional specifics and scale
5.1 Asia: The Core of Influence and Integration
Asia is a priority region, with more than 40% of all BRI projects concentrated here [5].
- Southeast Asia: – Indonesia: Jakarta–Bandung Railway (142 km, $7.3 billion), carried >5.79 million passengers [1];
- Laos: Kunming–Vientiane railway (414 km, $5.9 billion) [1];
- Thailand: BYD plant (capacity 150 thousand cars/year, investments > $1 billion) [1].
- Central Asia: – Investments in the first half of 2025 exceeded $24 billion [5];
- Kazakhstan: expansion of the oil refinery in Shymkent to 12 million tons per year, smart irrigation projects [26].
- South Asia: – Pakistan: CPEC, total investment >$62 billion [3];
- Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives: China has invested more than $150 billion since 2018 [3].
5.2 Europe: Technology and the Green Economy
- Investment volume in 2024: ~10 billion euros (+47% compared to 2023) [8];
- Hungary: the main recipient of investments – 3.1 billion euros, BYD and CATL plants [11];
- France: nuclear energy and battery production projects [12];
- Croatia, Serbia: construction of bridges and high-speed railways [10].
5.3 Africa: Infrastructure and Resources
Over 25 years of cooperation, large-scale projects have been implemented:
- Built/modernized: 10,000 km of railways, 100,000 km of roads, 100 ports, 66,000 km of power lines [14];
- Accumulated investments: $42.1 billion [16];
- Key objects: wind farms in South Africa, solar power stations in Kenya, railway networks in Ethiopia and Kenya [14, 17].
5.4 Latin America and the Caribbean
- 294 projects worth almost $130 billion were implemented, and more than 953 thousand jobs were created [19];
- Peru: the port of Chancay ($3.4 billion) is a key communications hub between Asia and South America [22];
- Brazil: investments >$4.8 billion in the automotive and energy industries [21];
- Active implementation of 5G and smart city technologies by Huawei [20].
Chapter 6. International Response and Prospects
6.1 Positions of the main players
- The United States and the West: view the growth of China’s influence as a threat to their interests and the existing world order, introduce technological restrictions, and strengthen their military presence in the Asia-Pacific region [1];
- Countries of the Global South: generally positive about investment, but express concerns about the “debt trap” and loss of sovereignty [10];
- Russia: develops a strategic partnership based on common interests in opposing the West, but seeks to maintain balance and independence [13].
6.2 Risks and Challenges
- Economic: slowing growth rates, high level of public debt [12];
- Demographic: aging population and reduction of labor force [11];
- Technological: continued dependence on imports of high-tech components [6].
6.3 Strategic horizon up to 2049
According to the plans, by 2030 China should finally become one of the leading world powers, and by 2049 it should become a “great modern socialist power,” equal to or superior to the United States in all key indicators [14]. To achieve this, it is assumed:
- Achieving complete technological sovereignty;
- Formation of a global system of communications centered around Beijing;
- Dominance in the Asia-Pacific region;
- Solution of key territorial issues [1, 3].
Conclusion
China’s geopolitical ambitions today are not tactics, but a clearly formulated strategy for decades, based on ideology, economics, military, and technology [13]. China is deliberately changing the world order, shifting the center of power to Eurasia and the Pacific region [13]. However, the path to leadership lies through confrontation with the West, internal problems, and the need to balance expansion and stability [14]. In the coming years, the world will increasingly feel Beijing’s influence—the only question is what price its historic ascent will impose on the entire world [14].