Battle of Beijing. How the pilgrimage of trump and Putin to Xi Jinping ended

In May, Xi Jinping received a rare and undoubtedly pleasant opportunity to be at the center of world politics. One by one, it was visited by the leaders of the United States and Russia. Such summits always attract attention, especially when they practically merge together. On May 14, Trump arrived in Beijing first accompanied by a ent for billionaires and with a list of wishes, most of which were not satisfied. Putin followed him on May 19, making it clear that he hopes to finally launch the Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline and demonstrate its proximity to Beijing. But he managed only the second. Xi Jinping came out of this “diplomatic marathon” winner – with an image of a slightly exaggerated, but still the most influential world leader.
Inverted triangle

Henry Kissinger has developed his “triangular diplomacy” (triangular diplomacy). Her idea is to rely on weaknesses in relations between China and the USSR and to balance between the other two poles – to approach one of the player in opposition to another, the strongest player at that time. Washington has balanciated Beijing against Moscow and Moscow against Beijing in an effort to create a more predictable, balanced strategic alignment. The United States was at the top. Two other powers, although they did not fight for Washington’s favor, but often had to cooperate with it.

In the last week, this geometry looked upside down. Both Trump and Putin are de facto opponents. They boast of close relations and mutual understanding, but at the same time participate in conflicts in several theaters of military operations, from Ukraine to Iran. The two leaders nevertheless felt obliged to make a “pilgrimage” to Beijing, which created a beautiful picture for Chinese newspapers: the middle state is becoming a truly median, key place where the diplomacy of the superpowers takes place and the fate of peoples is being fulfilled.

Trump and Putin felt obligated to commit a “pilgrimage” to Beijing

The time of the meetings – one after the other – looked symbolic and pointed to suspicions whether Xi managed to organize any behind-the-scenes deals between the powers.

Meanwhile, it is not worth overestimating this symbolism, no matter how beautiful it may seem. Trump’s visit has been postponed since the end of March because of the war in Iran. And Putin’s visit was scheduled in advance – including to celebrate the 25-year anniversary of the signing of the Good-Neighbourhood Treaty.
Two summits, zero news

Xi Jinping behaved differently with the guests, but the results of both meetings in principle are quite comparable.

With Trump, Xi was formal, suspended and generally restrained. He gave the President a luxurious reception with a red carpet, guard of honor and chorus and even held Trump at the residence of Zhongnanhai, the heart of the Communist Party. During this walk, Trump asked the Secretary General whether there are often leaders of other countries, to which Xi replied: “Extremely rarely. But, for example, Putin was here.” This, he kind of reminded the guest that his relationship with the Russian leader is much closer and more trusting.

The results of the summit were even colder. The partners did not quarrel, but as if they did not come to anything at all: both parties presented separate, completely divergent reports. In summing up the US, the focus was on trade councils, obligations on rare earth elements and “discussions” of the Strait of Hormuz. The Chinese side, in turn, did not mention anything about this, but focused on Taiwan and work on achieving “constructive strategic stability”.

Trump left Beijing even without a press conference – completely ignoring the questions of journalists at the final speech to the press.

Beijing, too, almost remained with anything, but was lucky: after the visit, Trump openly предупредил“warned” Taiwan that it should not seek independence, and said that he may not eventually sell weapons to Taiwan. And although there is no talk of any specific changes in US policy, this statement of Trump can be perceived as a concession to the PRC.

Putin’s visit, at first glance, was filled with a slightly different energy. Putin and Xi Jinping have repeatedly exchanged warm words, promises of friendship and signed a joint declaration in which Xi again gently criticized the United States as “uncontrolled unilateral hegemony.”

The two leaders also put their signatures under twenty small agreements covering cooperation in education, trade and visa-free travel for Russians in China. Most of these documents are very small and signed, rather, to give the summit a solidity.

However, the most important deal for the Russian president is the Power of Siberia-2, which would significantly expand Russian gas exports to China, and have not been reached. The parties stated that “a general understanding of the parameters”, and Peskov did not hesitate to report that “there is progress”.

Nevertheless, this “progress” is in the same place not for the first decade, and the promises of “more detailed research and criticism” from Chinese diplomats often represent simply polite “no, thank you, not yet interesting.”

This is not surprising: Putin came to Beijing, perhaps, a record weak even compared to visits in recent years. First, for the first time since August 2024, Russia lost more territory in Ukraine than it seized. Some sources from the US president’s visit to Beijing said: Xi allegedly told Trump that Putin “may regret that he has started this war.” Of course, both the American and Chinese sides denied this. But it is possible that this is not far from the truth.

Xi allegedly told Trump that Putin “may still regret that he started this war” 

The ratings of support for the Russian president within the country continue to fall, and the state is introducing increasingly unpopular measures to censorship. And in more raw materials from Russia, Beijing is not very interested in principle.

China is already buying cheap Russian oil and gas, becoming their largest importer. However, the country’s leadership has seriously focused on diversifying the energy infrastructure and continues to actively invest in alternative, green energy sources. The “Green Transition” is described in the last five-year plan. Moreover, for strategic security reasons, Beijing prefers not to depend excessively on a particular supplier. “Power of Siberia-2” does not fit in this policy very much.
Transactions of prisoners, non-inmates and imaginary

As usual, the most exciting rumors around Beijing summits, of course, concern the main question – whether this trilateral diplomatic dance can eventually lead to major deals on major modern crises: Ukraine and Iran. Can this unusual week lead to any concessions? For example, to the US compromise on Taiwan in exchange for China’s pressure on Russia in order to start negotiations on Ukraine. Or to help China achieve a ceasefire in Iran in exchange for some easing of technological constraints by America.

Of course, no one of the participants of the summits announced specific large-scale deals – and even more so not to sign, at least openly. But speculations of varying degrees of intelligence are enough. One of the “barrel coins” could be the refusal to support one or another party in both wars.

For example, some sources familiar with the content of the negotiations between Russia and the United States said that Vladimir Putin allegedly offered Trump to stop supplying Iran with intelligence information in exchange for similar measures from the United States towards Ukraine. This was actively discussed in March. However, then the special representative of Putin Kirill Dmitriev announced a report with this information lies. But in May, it could be one of those very behind-the-scenes deals.

Putin allegedly offered Trump to stop supplying Iran with intelligence information in exchange for similar measures from the United States against Ukraine

Beijing was not directly mentioned in these rumors. But Chinese firms are often becoming the main sources of satellite data that are leaking to Iran. So, Beijing would have to be included in the conditions, albeit informally.

The winner of Xi Jinping, in turn, from such a “deal” would also get – at least the image of the main diplomat and mediator of the planet. In addition, China, although it supports Iran, constant interruptions in the supply of fuel due to the Strait of Hormuz give him a lot of headaches.

Another potential diplomatic maneuver that was actively speculated by observers is the softening of US policy towards Taiwan in exchange for certain services from Beijing, whether it is mediation to open the Strait of Hormuz or concession in a trade war.

China is really concerned about the next upcoming supply of American weapons to Taiwan, and this is likely to be a key issue during the Secretary General’s visit to the United States this fall. However, in this case, it is difficult to present a deal mutually beneficial to the entire “triangle”. Weapons that are not supplied to Taiwan may sooner or later be in Ukraine. There is a great risk for Russia and the weakening of Iran, one of Moscow’s main military suppliers in recent years.

But, apparently, under no mysterious plans, no one has left their signatures – and, apparently, will not, at least not yet. And this is not surprising: all three sides have almost no points of contact that could form the basis of reliable agreements.

As for Ukraine, at the moment Xi Jinping, most likely, has no levers of influence that could quickly and significantly push Putin to negotiate, no reason to use them. Beijing may, of course, be concerned about the effects of the war on the global economy, the risk of secondary sanctions. But he still benefits from extremely cheap Russian energy resources, expects to profit from post-war contracts and, of course, learns from the experience of war. Therefore, whenever the war in Ukraine is over, Beijing has little reason to hurry too much.

In relation to Iran, Trump directly stated during the return flight that he “does not need services” from Xi Jinping and that he does not really expect help from China. This is completely contrary to his previous words and subsequent statements. Just a day later, the US president said that Xi was actually ready and even happy to help.

Russia, as a third party, in principle, is not very interested in ending the war in Iran: the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has raised prices for Russian oil, strengthened the ruble and distracts a little-precedented Trump from a possible decision to support Ukraine again.

In the end, we are not dealing with grandiose behind-the-scenes deals, but rather with shaky – and this is the key word – mutual understanding between the three powers. It, unfortunately, boils down to the acceptance of mutual claims and contradictions, which none of the three leaders is planning to decide so far. Each side has received enough – stability, image and continuity – to maintain relations without resolving any of the conflicts that underpin them.
Just watch

At the same time, China is still of the opinion that the best – and the least risky – diplomatic position is often simply to be a player with whom others are forced to conduct a dialogue. The player himself does not assume any irreversible obligations.

This is not exactly the same as the Kissinger triangle, where one power actively plays between two rival countries. China’s position is much more passive and perhaps even more stable in the short term. The problem is that this is a focus on the short term: beautiful visits and the image of the main political capital of the world are not able to solve real contradictions and problems in relations, which sooner or later will make themselves felt by China, the United States, and Russia.