Xi Visits the DPRK: Expectations vs Reality
On June 8-9, 2026, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee and President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping paid a state visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The visit was intended to strengthen cooperation between Beijing and Pyongyang.
Seoul’s Expectations
When the North Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announced the upcoming visit on June 5, the government of the Republic of Korea (ROK) immediately expressed hope that dialogue between Beijing and Pyongyang would contribute to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. It was anticipated that after the Beijing meeting — where, according to some reports, Donald Trump and Xi Jinping reportedly reached an understanding on the need to denuclearize the DPRK — the Chinese leader would travel to Pyongyang to discuss North Korea’s nuclear disarmament and inter-Korean dialogue.
In the current environment, where allies acquire particular importance, acknowledging reality becomes inevitable
However, Kim Jong Un took a defensive stance in advance. Shortly before Xi Jinping’s visit, he toured a nuclear materials production facility and pledged to significantly expand the country’s nuclear arsenal. At the same time, “first sister” Kim Yo Jong stated that North Korea’s nuclear status is a “red line that cannot be crossed,” making it clear that Pyongyang has no intention of discussing this issue, let alone abandoning its nuclear weapons.
There were also the traditional concerns from Western observers regarding China’s cooperation with Moscow. Speculation arose that Beijing would demand its cessation or seek ways to compensate for its influence. There were also suggestions that China would encourage Pyongyang to engage in dialogue with the United States. It was believed that such dialogue could weaken ties between North Korea and Russia without leading to direct confrontation with China. It was emphasized that the interests of Beijing and the concerns of Seoul coincide to a greater extent than the parties publicly acknowledge.
ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Park Il confirmed that Seoul will continue to unwaveringly uphold the goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. In turn, China has repeatedly reaffirmed the consistency of its position on Korean Peninsula issues, noting that the United States and China confirmed during their summit last month that the denuclearization of North Korea is a common goal.
Beijing’s Reality
President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping visited Pyongyang, emphasizing the importance of strengthening ties between China and North Korea amid a changing world order. The previous meeting between the two leaders took place in September of last year, when Kim Jong Un visited Beijing to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II.
On the eve of his visit, Xi Jinping published an article in North Korea’s main newspaper, Rodong Sinmun. The Chinese president called for closer strategic interaction and joint efforts to maintain the international order.
The main topics of the talks were strategic interaction and joint resistance to external pressure
On June 8, Xi Jinping arrived in Pyongyang accompanied by his wife Peng Liyuan and a high-level delegation. The delegation included senior officials such as Cai Qi, the first secretary of the CPC Central Committee Secretariat; Foreign Minister Wang Yi; Liu Haixing, head of the International Liaison Department of the CPC Central Committee; Tang Fangyu, head of the Central Political Research Office of the CPC Central Committee; Defense Minister Dong Jun; Zheng Shanjie, Chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission; Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao; and others.
At the airport, Xi Jinping and his wife were greeted by Kim Jong Un and his wife Ri Sol-ju. The motorcade then proceeded to central Pyongyang, where a grand welcoming ceremony was held at Kim Il Sung Square. The entire Presidium of the Political Bureau of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) was in attendance. Afterwards, the Chinese delegation arrived at the Kumsusan Guest House, where talks took place. The first day of the visit concluded with a banquet and a festive concert.
The following day, the leaders of the DPRK and China held a private meeting. They took a ride around the guest house grounds in an electric vehicle and then participated in two significant events.
The first point on the program was a visit to the Monument to Friendship, dedicated to Chinese volunteers who participated in the Korean War of 1950-1953. This site is symbolic for all Chinese delegations. On this occasion, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un laid flowers and toured the exhibition. They emphasized that the days when the peoples of the two countries shared joys and sorrows and fought together in the same trenches are an eternal, unforgettable, and indelible historical memory, and expressed their intention to cherish this memory.
The second important event was a visit to the Central Cadres Training School of the WPK. In honor of the occasion, the leaders of the DPRK and China planted a fir tree and installed a memorial stele nearby inscribed in Korean and Chinese: “The Korea-China friendship will be eternal. The tree was planted by Comrade Kim Jong Un and Comrade Xi Jinping on June 9, 2026.”
Kim Jong Un then escorted the distinguished guest to the airport, after which Xi sent him a thank-you telegram for the “fruitful summit and warm hospitality.” According to KCNA, Xi Jinping stated that the leaders of the two countries “had in-depth exchanges of views and reached important mutual understanding” on matters of mutual interest, which added “new substance” to relations between the two countries. Describing Beijing-Pyongyang relations as having “entered a new historical stage,” Xi Jinping expressed readiness to work with Kim Jong Un to strengthen and develop these ties.
Summit Results
The talks were filled with the traditional rhetoric common to both countries: that relations between Beijing and Pyongyang are not only state-to-state but also party-to-party relations united by socialist ideology; that the friendship between the two countries is independent of fluctuations in the international situation; and that both sides wish each other success in building a better society and improving the people’s quality of life.
Overall, the Chairman of State Affairs of the DPRK and the President of China agreed to start a new era in bilateral relations, act in each other’s interests, “jointly safeguard sovereignty and security” of their states, strengthen strategic communication through high-level visits, and bolster traditional friendship and cooperation in the political, economic, cultural, scientific, and military spheres. As the North Korean leader stated during the talks, strengthening ties with China is the most important strategic mission of his country, and he intends to carry it through to the end. In addition, Kim Jong Un expressed full support for the “One China” principle regardless of changes in the international situation and stated that the DPRK intends to make its relations with China a model of inter-state interaction.
Chinese media placed greater emphasis on President Xi’s statements. He declared that China and the DPRK should strengthen the foundation of political mutual trust and raise the level of practical cooperation, and put forward four proposals for developing bilateral relations: follow the strategic guidance of the leaders of both countries, cherish the unbreakable traditional friendship, expand practical cooperation in economy, trade, agriculture, healthcare, construction, and science, and strengthen exchanges in diplomacy, law enforcement, and military affairs. In response, Kim Jong Un described the special nature of bilateral relations as “deep traditional friendship” and recalled the progress achieved since their meeting with Xi in Beijing in September 2025.
Analysis of Xi Jinping’s Visit to the DPRK: Shift in Priorities and Geopolitical Changes (Author’s Commentary)
Although the talks did not result in any joint statements, certain conclusions about their outcomes can still be drawn:
– The presence in the Chinese delegation of the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Commerce, and the Chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission, along with the participation of North Korea’s Minister of Defense and First Vice Premier responsible for foreign economic relations, indicates that military and economic issues were discussed. Xi Jinping’s mention during the summit of bilateral military exchanges marks the first public reference to military cooperation between Beijing and Pyongyang.
– The inclusion of Tang Fangyu, head of the Central Political Research Office of the CPC Central Committee, and their joint visit with Xi and Kim to the WPK Central Cadres Training School may point to an exchange of experience in ideology or party building. It is believed that certain elements of the Chinese administrative system — such as the “two signs, one institution” model or the creation of intra-party counter-intelligence aimed at combating corruption and anti-socialist phenomena — are being adopted in the DPRK.
– The thank-you telegram sent after the visit is more than a mere diplomatic courtesy. It signals that the sides had genuinely constructive talks and that China was satisfied with the results.
– Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his country’s commitment to the “One China” principle, demonstrating support for Beijing on an issue of utmost importance to China.
The ROK Ministry of Unification noted the absence of any mention of Pyongyang’s nuclear program in reports on President Xi Jinping’s visit to North Korea. This contrasts with China’s position in 2019, when Beijing expressed support for efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.
China’s current rhetoric indicates a shift in focus. Instead of resolving North Korea’s nuclear issue, Beijing appears more interested in countering the United States. In the current environment, where allies acquire particular importance, acknowledging reality becomes inevitable. Given that the DPRK’s nuclear status is enshrined in its constitution, denuclearization is only possible with a change of political regime in the country.
Naturally, there were no attempts during the visit for China to act as a mediator in dialogue between Pyongyang and Seoul or Pyongyang and Washington. With increasing political bloc formation, such a role does not seem feasible.
The main topics of the talks were strategic interaction and joint resistance to external pressure. This may indicate that China increasingly views the DPRK as a key partner in its long-term geopolitical rivalry with the United States.
The Chinese side expressed readiness to strengthen ties in various areas, including diplomacy, law enforcement, defense, trade, agriculture, construction, science, technology, and medicine. Discussions also covered the full resumption of border crossings, the restart of civilian flights, and international passenger train services. The sides agreed to hold joint events to mark the 65th anniversary of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the DPRK and China, which will be celebrated in July 2026.
Thus, Seoul’s hopes for a change in Chinese policy were not realized. Instead of acting in the interests of the ROK, China appears to view North Korea as an important strategic ally. The value of this alliance is growing both in light of the successes of Kim Jong Un’s leadership and against the backdrop of global turbulence.