As war with Iran weakens US influence, China expands Middle East security role

The clearest example is the recent “Eagles of Civilisation 2026” military exercises with Egypt. The drills demonstrated capabilities that went beyond symbolic military diplomacy. China deployed J-16 fighter aircraft, a YY-20A aerial tanker, a KJ-500 airborne early-warning aircraft, an electronic warfare aircraft, and other support assets to Egypt.

For the first time, Chinese jet formations flew more than 6,000 kilometres beyond Asia to reach Egypt, with aerial refuelling conducted en route. Prior to this deployment, China had only sent the J-16 to the Russian Far East and Pakistan. As recently as last year, China-Egypt exercises involved smaller J-10C fighter jets and support aircraft.

Since then, Chinese and Egyptian pilots have conducted medium- and close-range air combat drills involving Chinese J-16s and Egyptian Rafales.

While the deployment does not suggest Beijing intends to fight a war in the Middle East, it demonstrates the People’s Liberation Army’s ability to operate alongside regional militaries and sustain forces far from China, well beyond its immediate neighbourhood.

China has also maintained a military presence in the wider region at sea. Since 2008, it has conducted naval escort operations in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia. As recently as August, its 49th escort task force departed for the region. Officially, the mission is focused on protecting international shipping and conducting anti-piracy operations.

Beijing has also expanded its military engagement through joint exercises. In 2025, it held naval drills with Iran and Russia in the Gulf of Oman. This August, it conducted the fourth Falcon Shield air force training exercise with the United Arab Emirates.

These deployments have increasingly featured more sophisticated platforms, including J-10 fighters, KJ-500 airborne early-warning aircraft and YY-20A aerial tankers.

A growing Chinese footprint

China is also becoming an increasingly significant, albeit indirect, player in Middle Eastern security. This comes as its close partner Pakistan expands its defence ties across the Gulf through the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) with Saudi Arabia, the Mecca Pact involving Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and a recently confirmed defence agreement with Kuwait.

As Islamabad deepens these partnerships, Chinese-made military equipment is likely to play a growing role in regional security architectures. Pakistan relies heavily on Chinese defence technology and has recently deployed HQ-9 air defence systems and JF-17 fighter jets, which it jointly produces with China, to Saudi Arabia.

For Beijing, such developments provide an opportunity to showcase its defence industry without assuming a formal security role in the region.

Instead, Chinese military technology can expand its footprint indirectly through Pakistani deployments, while systems such as the Beidou satellite network, already used across parts of the Arab world, further support the integration of Chinese-made platforms into regional security networks.

Could Beijing assume a larger security role?

Commenting on the prospect of a larger Chinese security role in the Middle East, Theodore Karasik, a fellow on Middle Eastern Affairs at the Jamestown Foundation, told The New Arab that Chinese technology and drones are already deeply embedded across the region, a trend he expects to continue.

Karasik argued that Beijing has benefited from US-Iran tensions while maintaining what he described as a “position of relative comfort”. Through infrastructure projects, commercial investments and growing arms sales, China has steadily expanded its regional footprint. He noted that Beijing’s involvement now extends to defence cooperation, including support for Saudi Arabia’s ballistic missile programme.

He also argued that America’s longstanding strategic focus elsewhere has created opportunities for China to deepen its engagement in the Middle East. Combined with platforms such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), he said, these developments point to an increasingly fragmented global order.

However, Karasik suggested that the future trajectory of China’s regional role may depend largely on Washington’s response. A renewed US effort to discourage partners from deepening ties with Beijing could constrain China’s ambitions, even as American policymakers remain focused on domestic political challenges and war with Iran.

While the Trump administration may seek to increase economic pressure on China, Karasik questioned how effective such measures would be. He added that President Xi Jinping’s anticipated visit to the White House could help shape Beijing’s approach.
Limits of Beijing’s emerging role

Lacking a network of alliances, bases, or permanently deployed forces comparable to those of Washington, China has little security infrastructure in the Middle East beyond its only officially acknowledged overseas military base in Djibouti. Therefore, even if Beijing seeks to keep Gulf waterways open or expand military cooperation, it lacks the capacity to deploy large-scale forces to defend Gulf states against Iran.

Moreover, China maintains similar close ties with multiple regional actors, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran and Egypt through Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships (CSPs), and an Innovative Comprehensive Partnership with Israel. Any steps Beijing takes are therefore likely to remain non-confrontational.

Zeeshan Shah, an analyst at FINRA in Washington, told The New Arab that China has adopted a more subtle approach since the US-Iran war began. However, “regardless of official Chinese pronouncements on securing international waterways, or recent military exercises with Egypt”, he argued that Beijing is unlikely to move towards a more muscular form of engagement.

In his view, China primarily sees competition with the United States through an economic lens. While the threat of US sanctions has irritated Beijing, China has historically refrained from enforcing other sanctions against Iran.

Shah also noted that, despite maintaining strong commercial relations with Israel, China has generally refrained from using that relationship to influence Israeli policy. Whether Beijing chooses to leverage those ties more actively in the future, he argued, remains an open question.

The Chinese perspective

China’s position during the Iran war has highlighted both the opportunities and contradictions in its emerging regional role. Beijing has presented itself as a stakeholder in de-escalation, particularly as the conflict has threatened Gulf security and the free flow of energy.

On 24 August, Foreign Minister Wang Yi told Kuwait’s foreign minister that the Middle East and Gulf had reached a “critical juncture” and called for a return to dialogue, while saying China was ready to strengthen coordination with Kuwait and contribute to regional peace and stability. China has also engaged directly with regional actors and mediators as it seeks to protect its economic interests and prevent the conflict from disrupting trade and energy supplies.

But Beijing’s position is complicated by its alleged role in sustaining Iran’s military capabilities. US officials and recent reporting have identified Chinese companies and intermediaries as suppliers of military equipment and components to Iran, including a reported deal for hundreds of Chinese-made QW-12 and FN-16 man-portable air-defence missiles during the conflict.

Chinese manufacturing has also been central to Iran’s wider drone ecosystem, with Chinese firms and suppliers providing components used in Iranian systems. At the same time, Washington has increasingly targeted China-linked entities over support for Iran’s missile, drone and oil sectors.

In other words, Beijing could assume a larger regional role if it chose to do so.

For a clearer understanding of China’s intentions and the limits it places on its regional ambitions, The New Arab spoke to Li Chao, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of China Media Group (CMG) Middle East.

In his view, although China’s role in Middle Eastern security affairs is expanding, Beijing has no desire to challenge, replicate the American model or become the region’s new “policeman”.

Describing the shift as a move away from a relatively narrow focus on economic and diplomatic engagement, Chao said China is pursuing “a broader, more integrated, but still restrained form of security involvement”. Driven by practical interests such as energy, trade, investment and the presence of Chinese personnel in the Middle East, he argued that it has become “increasingly difficult to sustain the old model of deep economic engagement but limited security involvement”.

However, Chao stressed that Beijing is not pursuing military alliances or large-scale permanent deployments. Instead, it is expanding its security presence through low-intensity instruments that form a “mutually reinforcing framework”, which is intended not to replace the United States but to reduce the risks that regional instability poses to Chinese interests.

He argued that China’s Middle East strategy is centred on the normalisation of security engagement rather than militarisation. At the same time, Chao acknowledged the limits of this approach, noting that China does not possess an extensive military network comparable to that of the United States.

As a result, Chao said Beijing is likely to follow “a model of limited commitment, selective participation and avoidance of formal alliances”. He argued that China’s role would only enter a more substantive phase if it began participating in multilateral security mechanisms or institutionalised security cooperation across the region.

Until then, China’s expanding security footprint is likely to remain cautious, selective and largely shaped by its economic interests.