The Rise Of BRISCO – Analysis

Key Takeaways:

• The author says the SCO is no longer just a China–Russia security club: India and Pakistan joined at Astana in 2017, later Iran and Belarus, so rivals keep talking on Afghanistan, terror, drugs, trade and energy without settling Kashmir or other feuds.
• Central Asian founders are framed as multi-vector actors, not extras in a great-power game; overlapping SCO and BRICS membership is labelled “BRISCO”—a habit of using several forums, not a merged anti-Western bloc.
• Value is measured in open channels and competing transport routes, not declarations; the piece warns corridors can still lock in raw-export dependence and tees up a later look at the New Delhi BRICS summit and AI rules.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is often described as a security grouping led by China and Russia. That is true, but no longer appropriate. An organisation formed to ease tensions along the former Sino-Soviet border now includes India, Pakistan, Iran and Belarus. It brings together governments divided by territorial disputes, wars, rival partnerships and sharply different ambitions. It cannot remove those divisions. Yet it requires members to keep meeting despite them.

This article considers what that widening membership means for the Global South, and especially for the Central Asian republics that helped create the SCO. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are sometimes treated as supporting actors in a contest among Russia, China and the West. Their own conduct tells a different story. Since the end of the Soviet Union, they have tried to widen their choices by working with several powers at once, without placing their future entirely in the hands of any one of them.

The admission of India and Pakistan as full members at the Astana summit in June 2017 tested that approach. The two neighbours did not set aside their disputes when they joined. Nor did the SCO become a forum for settling Kashmir or ending terrorism. Nine years later, relations between New Delhi and Islamabad remain burdened by mutual suspicion and interrupted dialogue. Yet both still sit in the same organisation and must address problems that cross their borders: Afghanistan, extremism, narcotics, trade, transport, energy and regional stability.

That limited record shows both the value and the weakness of organisations emerging outside the Western-led system. The SCO is not a union of like-minded states, still less the government of a new world order. It offers regular contact where trust is scarce. Leaders, ministers, diplomats and security officials meet, negotiate a common language, and sometimes hold bilateral talks at the edge of the main gathering. Keeping those channels open is not a settlement, but it can keep a bad relationship from becoming worse.

The story extends beyond the SCO because China, India, Iran and Russia also belong to BRICS. I use BRISCO to describe that overlap, not a new institution and certainly not a merger. It is a way of examining how governments use several forums at once: one mainly concerned with Eurasian security, another with development, finance, and reform of international institutions, and smaller arrangements dealing with transport, energy, and trade. Their interests coincide in some areas and clash in others.

This overlap is one sign that global affairs are no longer organised around a single centre. It does not mean that a coherent rival order has appeared. It means countries with different political systems and allegiances are looking for more places to bargain, more trade routes, and more protection against dependence. Central Asia, once discussed chiefly as a zone between empires, is becoming one of the places where that change is clearest.

From Tashkent to Astana

Central Asia had long provided diplomatic ground for India and Pakistan.

In January 1966, following the war of 1965, Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan met in Tashkent under the auspices of Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin. In the Tashkent Declaration, they agreed to withdraw their forces, restore diplomatic relations and seek peaceful means of resolving their disputes. Shastri died in Tashkent only hours after signing the declaration.

Tashkent and Astana were very different occasions. Tashkent was an attempt to step back from war; Astana marked the enlargement of an international organisation. Both, however, allowed India and Pakistan to meet away from the pressures surrounding their relationship at home.

I attended the Astana summit as a journalist in June 2017, during one of at least three visits I made to Kazakhstan. The leaders met in the Palace of Independence, while most accredited journalists followed the opening proceedings on screens in the International Media Centre on the second floor. A sizeable contingent had come from India. We could watch the speeches and ceremonies, but not the negotiations behind them.

Outside the formal proceedings, I spoke with members of the Indian and Pakistani delegations. They made no declarations of friendship, and none was expected. What struck me was the absence of open animosity. Neither side pretended that the disputes between the two countries had disappeared. Nor did either feel compelled to import the quarrel into every conversation. For those hours in Astana, they were also representatives of two countries entering the same Eurasian organisation.

In my report from the summit, I wrote that Kazakh officials hoped SCO membership might give India and Pakistan another place in which to talk. Diplomats were careful not to exaggerate what it could accomplish. Mumtaz Zahra Baloch, then Pakistan’s deputy ambassador to China, described it as an organisation in which both countries could work on regional problems and development rather than settle their bilateral disputes. UN Secretary-General António Guterres said their entry created a new space in which they might address their differences. My report ended by asking whether the hopes expressed in Astana would survive once the ceremony was over. The record since then has been mixed, but the two countries have remained at the same table.

This matters because Central Asia is still too often described as territory upon which larger powers act. For much of the outside world, it has been Russia’s former domain, China’s western corridor, the West’s route to Afghanistan or the setting of a revived Great Game. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan appear in such accounts mainly when Moscow, Beijing, Washington or Brussels turn towards them.

The view from the region is more complicated. These countries cannot choose their geography. Russia remains present through language, migration, trade, infrastructure and security links. China has become an immense economic neighbour. Afghanistan brings risks that cross borders. War, sanctions, water shortages and climate change add to their difficulties.

Yet they are not passive. Since independence in 1991, the Central Asian republics have worked with several partners at once. Kazakhstan calls this a multi-vector foreign policy. It maintains close relations with Russia and China while dealing with Europe, the United States, Türkiye, India, Japan, the Gulf states and international organisations. Uzbekistan has opened itself more actively to regional cooperation and investment. The smaller republics seek their own combinations of security, commerce, transit income and diplomatic support.

They do not always agree, and their political systems raise serious questions. Their freedom of action is also unequal. Even so, they are no longer simply somebody else’s backyard.

A wider meaning of the South

The expression “Global South” has never been a geographical description. Australia lies in the Southern Hemisphere but belongs politically and economically to the Global North. India and most of China lie north of the equator. So do all five Central Asian republics.

The term generally refers to countries whose influence in international institutions has not matched their populations, resources or economic importance. Colonial rule, outside domination, or unequal entry into the world economy shaped many of them. They now seek a greater say in decisions that affect them.

Central Asia does not fit neatly into the history of European overseas colonialism. The region was absorbed into the Russian Empire and later incorporated into the Soviet Union. When the Soviet state dissolved, its Central Asian republics inherited borders, administrative structures, industries and transport systems built around Moscow. They also had to recover languages, histories and identities that had long been subject to outside rule.

This history helps explain why Central Asian countries increasingly appear in discussions of the Global South. They want investment and access to markets, but not permanent dependence on one patron. The SCO brings them into regular meetings with China, Russia, India, Pakistan and Iran. The larger states carry more weight, but the organisation began in Central Asia and still reflects the region’s preference for dealing with several powers at once.

What the SCO can—and cannot—do

The SCO grew out of the Shanghai Five, established in the 1990s by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to reduce military tensions and build confidence along borders unsettled by the Soviet Union’s collapse. Uzbekistan joined when the organisation was formally created in 2001.

Its early agenda concentrated on terrorism, separatism and extremism—the “three evils” in the organisation’s vocabulary. It established a Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure and encouraged cooperation among intelligence and security services. Supporters regarded this as a necessary response to militant movements, trafficking and instability from Afghanistan. Critics argued that governments could use the same language to suppress domestic opposition.

Those concerns have not disappeared. The SCO’s emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference can protect countries from outside pressure, but it can also shield governments from scrutiny. An international order can become more representative of states without becoming more protective of their citizens.

The SCO is not an Asian NATO. It has no equivalent of NATO’s commitment to collective defence. Its members do not share a single view of their adversaries. India and China have an unresolved and sometimes violent border dispute. India and Pakistan accuse one another of supporting terrorism. The Central Asian states are wary of losing sovereignty to any larger neighbour. Iran has its own conflicts with the United States and Israel, while other members do not wish to inherit them.

The SCO’s practical value is less dramatic. It ensures regular meetings among governments that often disagree. Presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers, security advisers and officials have to negotiate common statements. Bilateral discussions can take place around the larger gathering. A government can challenge another and still return to the next meeting.

That was the significance of India and Pakistan joining together in 2017. India entered a forum that included China, its principal Asian competitor; Russia, its long-standing strategic partner; the Central Asian republics, with which it wanted stronger relations; and Pakistan, its most persistent adversary. Membership did not transform these relationships. It ensured that they would be discussed at regular meetings.

The organisation changed as well. It could no longer be regarded mainly as a mechanism for the old Sino-Soviet borderlands. India brought its population, economy and independent foreign policy. Pakistan connected the organisation more closely to Afghanistan and the Arabian Sea. Iran’s admission in 2023 carried it further into West Asia. Belarus joined in 2024, extending its reach westward.

Enlargement has increased the SCO’s importance while making agreement harder. That is the price of admitting countries with conflicting interests.

The routes that matter

Security brought the SCO into being, but Central Asia’s future will depend just as much on economics and transport.

The region is rich in oil, gas, uranium and other minerals, yet it is landlocked. Railways, roads, pipelines, ports, customs procedures and digital links determine whether its countries can reach markets—and through whose territory. The proposed routes also show where dependence may arise.

China sees Central Asia as indispensable to the Belt and Road Initiative’s land routes. Russia seeks to retain the north–South and east–west connections developed during the Soviet period. Kazakhstan has promoted routes across the Caspian Sea towards the South Caucasus and Europe. Uzbekistan supports new railway links, including the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan route. Iran offers a path to the Persian Gulf. India has backed the development of Chabahar port partly because it offers access to Afghanistan and Central Asia without crossing Pakistan.

These projects are often presented as rival corridors. For Central Asian countries, several routes are safer than one. War, sanctions or a closed frontier can interrupt trade; alternatives strengthen their bargaining position.

But a railway is not independence by itself. The harder questions are who finances it, who owns it, whose technical standards apply and what travels in each direction. If minerals and energy leave while manufactured goods enter, Central Asia may become better connected without becoming more prosperous or more autonomous. Transit fees cannot substitute for industries, skills and employment.

The SCO’s value will not ultimately be measured by the number of declarations it issues. It will be measured by whether cooperation produces reliable transport, work beyond extractive industries, secure food and energy supplies, and greater protection against climate change.

Why BRISCO?

The SCO and BRICS were created for different purposes. The SCO began with border security and remains rooted in Eurasia. BRICS developed as cooperation among large emerging economies and now addresses development finance, trade, technology and the reform of international institutions. Its membership reaches Africa, Latin America and West Asia. The New Development Bank gives it its own financial instrument.

Yet four important countries—China, India, Iran and Russia—belong to both. Other states take part as members, partners, observers or guests. Leaders and officials meet in one organisation and continue their conversations in the other.

I use BRISCO as a convenient name for the point at which they meet. It is not another organisation, nor a proposal to combine the two. A merger would probably carry every dispute from each body into the other. What matters is that many of the same governments meet in both.

The SCO can discuss security. BRICS and the New Development Bank can pursue development finance. Smaller groups can work on transport or energy. A disagreement left unresolved in one meeting may be approached through different participants in another.

Their participation also shows that countries need not belong exclusively to one camp. India can take part in the SCO and BRICS while working with the United States, Japan and Australia in the Quad and expanding relations with Europe. Kazakhstan can cooperate closely with China and Russia while seeking European, American, Japanese and Indian investment.

China and Russia often present BRICS and the SCO as evidence that Western predominance is ending. Iran sees them as routes around isolation and sanctions. Their declarations frequently criticise unilateral coercive measures, protectionism and unequal control of international institutions.

Nevertheless, calling BRISCO an anti-Western alliance would be misleading. India does not wish to replace Western predominance with Chinese predominance. Central Asian countries do not want a new Cold War in which they must choose a permanent patron. Members of the two organisations disagree about wars, borders, terrorism, trade and the meaning of sovereignty.

A bloc requires more than dissatisfaction with the existing order. It requires a common view of threats and a willingness to bear costs on behalf of other members. Neither the SCO nor BRICS consistently meets that test.

BRISCO describes countries seeking greater influence through two organisations not led by the West. They agree that power should be shared more widely. They do not agree on all the rules that should follow.

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The lesson of Astana

Astana did not announce the arrival of a new international order. The summit enlarged an existing organisation and brought two adversaries into it at the same time. Its lasting importance lies in that modest fact. Countries do not have to become friends before they can work in the same organisation. Sometimes the organisation matters precisely because friendship is absent.

The SCO has not restored dialogue between India and Pakistan, stabilised Afghanistan or resolved the rivalry between India and China. Its statements can be vague, and it applies its principles selectively. But failure to settle the largest disputes does not make the meetings useless. The alternative may be no meeting at all.

Tashkent in 1966 and Astana in 2017 belong to different periods, yet both remind us that Central Asia has been more than a backdrop for larger countries. Its governments have spent more than three decades learning how to live beside powerful neighbours without surrendering control of their foreign relations.

BRISCO could give Central Asia and other Global South countries greater influence. It could also provide another forum in which China, Russia and other large states pursue their own interests. Cooperation and rivalry are likely to continue together.

The first article in this series argued that globalisation has survived while the order that managed it is losing authority. The SCO suggests that no single replacement is waiting. Instead, old adversaries, rising powers and smaller states are using several organisations to protect their interests and increase their influence.

Whether that produces a fairer order will depend less on membership expansion than on how members use their influence. Part Three turns to the New Delhi BRICS summit, where India tried to find common ground between Iran and the United Arab Emirates and where another contest took shape—over who will write the rules for artificial intelligence.